Quick Hits

• New York City Executive Order No. 17 directs city agencies to create guidance, gather data, improve worker protections, expand restroom and cooling information, and prepare for stronger rules addressing extreme heat in the workplace.
• Although it does not directly impose new duties on private employers, the order creates a citywide framework for heat illness prevention that employers should monitor and may wish to follow in advance of future regulation.
• The order responds to growing heat risks for outdoor, indoor, construction, gig, delivery, and municipal workers by requiring multilingual guidance, agency heat plans, data review, strict restroom access enforcement, and public heat relief messaging.

The order is grounded in findings that roughly 1.4 million New Yorkers—about a third of the city’s workforce—work outdoors for prolonged periods, and that the city could experience more than four times as many heat waves each year by the 2050s. While the order’s obligations fall primarily on city agencies rather than private employers, it sets out a detailed framework and timeline that employers should understand. The order took effect immediately.

Background and Findings

The order’s preamble sets out the rationale for action. It finds that “hundreds of thousands of workers in New York City” face heat-related illness and death on hot days, and that extreme heat increases the risk of all categories of workplace injury while reducing productivity. It cites scientific evidence that worker productivity decreases by approximately 2 percent for every one degree Celsius above the comfort range.

The order also notes that many construction workers, street vendors, app-based delivery workers, day laborers, and other gig workers lack paid breaks and easy restroom access, leading some to limit water intake and increase their risk of dehydration and related conditions.

Worker Heat Illness Prevention Guidance

At the heart of the order is a mandate for new heat illness prevention guidance. The Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DOHMH), working with NYC Emergency Management and the Department of Citywide Administrative Services, must develop best-practice guidance and educational materials for both indoor and outdoor workers. Importantly, the materials must be produced in the languages commonly spoken by the city’s workers and must cover not just employees but independent contractors, gig workers, and day laborers.

A long list of agencies will help disseminate the materials. DOHMH must prepare outdoor worker guidance “as soon as practicable” and submit indoor worker guidance by March 1, 2027.

Construction and Municipal Worker Protections

The order singles out two groups for heightened attention. The Department of Buildings (DOB) must review whether existing construction safety and training requirements adequately protect against heat illness, consult with worker organizations, and may issue new recommendations—also due by March 1, 2027.

Separately, all mayoral agencies must develop and implement their own indoor and outdoor heat illness plans so that city employees and contractors are protected whenever the city’s Heat Emergency Plan is activated. When that plan is triggered, New York City Emergency Management (NYCEM) will push out heat illness prevention information and employer recommendations tied to the forecasted temperature.

Data Collection and Reporting Requirements

Several provisions focus on building a heat-illness evidence base. The order directs DOHMH to review workers’ compensation claims filed by city employees to identify patterns related to temperature, including excess risk during hot weather. DOHMH will study whether to add heat-related illnesses to the Diseases and Conditions of Public Health Interest that are reportable under the City Health Code. This step could eventually require health care professionals to report such conditions, including the patient’s employer and place of employment.

The DOB is directed, during periods of high heat, to remind property owners, contractors, and others in control of construction sites of their existing obligation to report heat-related incidents requiring emergency transport or immediate emergency care.

Restroom Access and Heat Relief

The order also addresses access to restrooms and relief from the heat. During periods of high heat, city agencies with jurisdiction over worker protection measures must strictly enforce laws and rules that increase restroom access for outdoor workers, including the Administrative Code provision granting food delivery workers the right to use the restrooms of the restaurants for which they make deliveries, regardless of whether they are employed by the restaurant.

The city must also continue implementing free public restrooms and must include information about restrooms, cooling centers, Parks Department cooling locations, water features, drinking fountains, and shaded locations in its messaging to workers.

Implications for Employers

Although Executive Order No. 17 directs city agencies rather than imposing direct obligations on private employers, employers should monitor its implementation closely. Today’s guidance often becomes tomorrow’s requirements. The forthcoming DOHMH guidance is likely to become the practical benchmark for heat-safety measures in New York City. The order also notes that the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) has proposed a federal rule requiring employers to take heat-protection steps for indoor and outdoor workers, signaling the broader regulatory direction. While this rule has stalled, states across the country are beginning to enact their own heat injury and illness prevention regulations. New York City (and possibly the state) may not be far behind.

Employers that align their practices with the city’s guidance and the proposed federal standard will be better positioned as those requirements take shape.

Next Steps

Even though this order does not create any new requirements for private employers, there is still room for proactive action. Employers can consider taking the following steps now: developing a written heat illness prevention plan covering both indoor and outdoor work; incorporating rest, water, and shade during high-heat periods; ensuring restroom access for field and delivery staff; training supervisors to recognize the early signs of heat illness; providing safety materials in the languages spoken by their workforce; and documenting hot-weather response protocols.

Employers should also monitor the release of the city’s outdoor worker guidance and the progress of the OSHA rule in order to align their policies as the regulatory framework develops.

Ogletree Deakins’ New York office and Workplace Safety and Health Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and provide updates on the Construction, New York, and Workplace Safety and Health blogs as the city’s heat illness prevention guidance and related requirements are issued.

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Quick Hits

• The Rhode Island General Assembly wrapped up its 2026 legislative session on June 11, 2026, after passing several bills impacting employers.
• New enactments address grocery store self-service checkouts and employee monitors, provide warehouse worker protections, and expand Rhode Island’s Fair Employment Practices Act to cover domestic workers.
• Lawmakers failed to pass some notable proposals, including bills that would have regulated AI use and electronic monitoring in workplaces, provided protections against workplace bullying, and expanded caregiver leave.

Enacted Legislation Impacting Employers

Senate Bill (S) 2342 Sub B / House Bill (H) 7290 Sub A—Restrictions on Self-Service Checkout Stations Act—Effective January 1, 2027

This statute places limits on the number of self-service checkout stations a grocery store can have and on the workload of employees assigned to monitor those checkout stations. The law mandates that grocery stores “have a minimum of one manual checkout station in operation for every three (3) self-service checkout stations in operation” with at least one manual checkout station that complies with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

S 2504 Sub A / H 7364 Sub A—Warehouse Worker Protection Act—Effective January 1, 2027

This law requires employers to provide each employee of a warehouse distribution center, upon hire, with a written description of each applicable quota within defined time periods and of the adverse employment action for failure to meet the quota. The law prohibits employers from requiring workers to meet quotas that prevent them from taking required meal and rest periods or using the bathroom.

S 2921 / H 8504—Domestic Service Workers Added to the Definition of ‘Employees’ Under FEPA—Effective June 10, 2026

Rhode Island lawmakers have recently taken legislative steps to treat domestic workers like other employees under Rhode Island’s labor and employment laws. In 2024, Rhode Island amended its minimum wage law to include domestic workers. This year, lawmakers passed and enacted S 2921 / H 8504, amending the definition of “employee” under the Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), Rhode Island General Law Section 28-5-6, to similarly include individuals employed in domestic service.

Notable Bills That Failed to Pass

S 2502 / H 8505—Proposed Workplace Psychological Safety Act

For the past few legislative sessions, lawmakers have proposed the Workplace Psychological Safety Act to prohibit bullying and psychological abuse in the workplace. Business-interest and civil-rights groups have raised various concerns about past versions of this legislation. Although this year’s version of the bill attempted to address some of those concerns, it failed to address all of them and did not pass in the Rhode Island House of Representatives.

S 2166 / H 7490—Overtime Wages for Exempt Workers

This bill would have required small employers with fifty or fewer employees and large employers with more than fifty employees “in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity” under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) to pay overtime wages to exempt workers if their salaries exceed varying multipliers of minimum wage for a forty-hour workweek. This bill failed to pass.

S 2499 Sub A / H 7767—AI Use in the Workplace

This bill would have created a comprehensive statutory framework to address and regulate the use of AI technology, defined as “automated decision system[s] (ADS),” in the workplace to make employment decisions (i.e., hiring, promotion, or disciplinary decisions) when such decisions rely on data collected through electronic monitoring. H 7767 sought to impose requirements for “prior notice” of electronic monitoring, certain recordkeeping obligations, and employee anti-retaliation protections. Although this bill passed in the Rhode Island Senate, it failed to gain traction in the House.

S 2737 Sub A / H 7968—Temporary Caregiver Leave Benefits Expansion

In recent years, lawmakers have considered expanding temporary caregiver benefits to extend to a broadened class of individuals for whom an employee can serve as a caregiver, lengthen the time an employee can receive temporary caregiver benefits, and increase the amount employees can receive through wage-replacement benefits under the temporary caregiver program. This year was no exception: Lawmakers introduced a bill that would have expanded the definition of individuals for whom an employee may serve as a caregiver to include a grandchild and a “care recipient,” as well as increased the amount of time an employee could receive temporary caregiver benefits from eight weeks to ten weeks in 2027 and twelve weeks in 2028. The Senate passed this bill, but the legislation failed to pass in the House.

Staying Informed

Ogletree Deakins’ Providence and Boston offices will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Employment Law and Rhode Island blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• On June 25, 2026, the Supreme Court held in Mullin v. Doe that the TPS statute bars judicial review of nonconstitutional challenges to the DHS secretary’s termination of a country’s TPS designation.
• When the terminations take effect, Haitian and Syrian employees’ TPS-based employment authorization and protection from removal will end.
• Employers should expect further guidance from governmental agencies on timing and on how to handle Form I-9 reverification.

The 6–3 decision in Mullin v. Doe lifts lower-court orders that had paused prior TPS Haiti and Syria terminations, clearing the way for TPS holders to lose work authorization and protection from removal.

Background

The TPS designation was created to provide temporary status to foreign nationals in the United States unable to return to their home countries due to events or circumstances present in the countries, such as natural disasters, armed conflicts, or other extraordinary conditions. During the designated TPS period, TPS beneficiaries are not removable from the United States, can obtain work authorization (EAD), and can apply for travel authorization.

DHS designated Haiti for TPS in 2010 following a devastating earthquake and designated Syria in 2012 because of conditions related to the country’s civil war. In 2025, then-secretary of homeland security Kristi Noem announced the termination of both designations: Syria through a September 2025 Federal Register notice and Haiti through a November 2025 notice, with the Haiti termination set to take effect February 3, 2026.

TPS holders challenged the terminations in federal court. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Syria) and the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (Haiti) each granted interim relief postponing the terminations, finding, among other things, that DHS had likely failed to consult appropriate agencies about current country conditions as the statute requires. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit declined to stay those orders. The Supreme Court granted review before judgment and consolidated the cases.

Analysis and Impact

The Supreme Court ruled that courts generally cannot review TPS termination decisions and lifted prior interim pauses, allowing the termination of TPS Haiti and TPS Syria to move forward. Further, the court dismissed an equal protection challenge arguing Haiti’s termination was motivated by race, concluding the claim was unlikely to succeed.

Key Takeaways for Employers

Employers should expect employees on Temporary Protected Status (TPS) Haiti or Syria to lose work authorization. As terminations take effect, affected employees’ TPS-based EADs and protection from removal will lapse, which may trigger Form I-9 reverification obligations for their employers.

Governmental agencies are expected to publish further guidance on exact termination timelines and proper I-9 reverification.

Reviewing ongoing compliance requirements and understanding I-9 documentation obligations remain the most proactive methods for ensuring employers remain compliant. A Status Change Report is available for E-Verify employers through the E-Verify system to monitor rescission of EADs under humanitarian programs that were valid when E-Verify was initially completed. Humanitarian-based EAD programs, including TPS, are subject to frequent updates, and it is important for employers to stay informed. Employers may want to develop and implement an internal protocol for tracking updates and monitoring compliance.

Ogletree Deakins’ Immigration Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Immigration blog as additional information becomes available.

For more insight into this development and other critical immigration issues facing employers today, please join our Virtual Immigration Insights Symposium on Wednesday, October 7, 2026, from noon to 2:30 p.m. ET. Register here.

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Quick Hits

• The Colorado Supreme Court ruled that employees may bring wrongful termination claims if fired for acting in self-defense, even if their lawful exercise of the right to self-defense violates employer policies prohibiting confrontations.
• The court identified a public-policy exception to at-will employment, emphasizing that termination cannot penalize employees for exercising their statutory and constitutional right of self-defense.
• The decision highlights potential wrongful termination liability for employers if they discharge employees for lawful actions taken in self-defense in the workplace.

Answering a certified question from the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado, the Colorado Supreme Court issued a landmark 5–2 ruling, holding that the right to self-defense, as expressed by both statute and the Colorado Constitution, supports a public-policy exception to the doctrine of at-will employment.

The certified question stemmed from a wrongful termination lawsuit filed by a convenience store employee after she was discharged following her response to an alleged armed robbery. The certified question was:

Does Colorado law recognize a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine that allows an employee to bring a wrongful termination claim in the event the employee is terminated for actions taken in self-defense?

The store’s policy prohibited employees from confronting shoplifters, though the employee claimed she had acted in self-defense.

Public-Policy Exception to At-Will Employment

While the doctrine of at-will employment generally allows employers and employees to terminate their employment relationship at any time, the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized a public-policy exception, whereby employers are prohibited from discharging employees for reasons that would be “detrimental to the public good.”

The Colorado high court pointed to its prior precedent and its four-part test for determining whether an at-will employee has established that a discharge violated public policy by showing:

(1) that the employer directed the employee to perform an illegal act as part of the employee’s work related duties or prohibited the employee from performing a public duty or exercising an important job-related right or privilege;

(2) that the action directed by the employer would violate a specific statute relating to the public health, safety, or welfare, or would undermine a clearly expressed public policy relating to the employee’s basic responsibility as a citizen or the employee’s right or privilege as a worker; …

(3) that the employee was terminated as the result of refusing to perform the act directed by the employer[; and] …

(4) that the employer was aware, or reasonably should have been aware, that the employee’s refusal to comply with the employer’s order or directive was based on the employee’s reasonable belief that the action ordered by the employer was illegal, contrary to clearly expressed statutory policy relating to the employee’s duty as a citizen, or violative of the employee’s legal right or privilege as a worker.

The Colorado high court found that both section 18-1-704 of the Colorado Revised Statutes and article II, section 3 of the Colorado Constitution establish a right to self-defense. Reasoning that the right to self-defense is “an essential, inalienable right guaranteed to all people,” the court found that employees may not be prohibited from defending themselves at work. The court thus concluded that the right to self-defense “is job-related insofar as the need to exercise the right to defend oneself from an unprovoked attack can occur anywhere, including at work.”

Self-Defense Can Apply in the Workplace

The court answered the certified question in the affirmative: Colorado law recognizes a public-policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine that allows an employee to bring a wrongful termination claim in the event the employee is terminated for actions taken in self-defense.

The court’s majority essentially viewed the question as whether an employee must choose between his or her job and following the employer’s policies, or between the job and exercising a public right of self-defense. The court stated, “[A]n employer may not use termination to penalize an employee for exercising a constitutional or statutory right that reflects an important, clearly expressed public policy that affects the public.” The court noted that “this does not mean that an employer may not place reasonable limitations on these broader, societal rights to maintain the efficiency, safety, and stability of a workplace.”

Still, the court noted that it had not decided whether the convenience store’s policy barred employees from acting in self-defense or whether it simply prohibited employees from confronting shoplifters. Further, the court did not determine whether the employee had lawfully acted in self-defense.

The Dissent

Two justices dissented, reasoning that the Colorado Constitution restrained only government action and that the majority’s ruling was divorced from the facts of the case, which, they found, suggested that the convenience store employee had done more than act in self-defense and had attempted to stop a shoplifter. They criticized the majority for holding that a constitutional protection against state action could restrict a private employer from lawfully discharging an at-will employee for conduct that violated the employer’s policies. The dissent expressed concern that the court had equated a “job-related right,” as stated in precedent, with a more generic right guaranteed to “everyone.”

Key Takeaways

The Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling is a significant development for employers with operations in the state. The decision establishes that employers may face wrongful termination liability if they discharge an employee for lawfully exercising the right to self-defense in response to an unprovoked attack at work.

However, the decision indicates that the right to self-defense is “narrow,” applying “only when an employee lawfully exercises the right in response to an unprovoked attack at work,” and that there are bounds on what actions constitute lawful self-defense under the circumstances. The court noted that the ruling “does not mean that an employer may not place reasonable limitations on these broader, societal rights to maintain the efficiency, safety, and stability of a workplace.”

This ruling thus suggests that employers may still be able to enforce properly tailored workplace “no confrontation” or de-escalation policies in certain circumstances. Indeed, the Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling did not analyze the specific facts of the underlying case, determine whether the employee had lawfully acted in self-defense, or find that the employee had violated the employer’s no-confrontation policy.

In light of the decision, Colorado employers may want to review their workplace policies and examine the extent to which they might inadvertently infringe employees’ right to self-defense.

Ogletree Deakins’ Denver office will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Colorado, Employment Law, Retail, Workplace Safety and Health, and Workplace Violence Prevention blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• On June 23, 2026, DHS proposed a rule that would increase the Form N-400 paper filing fee from $760 to $1,330 and the online filing fee from $710 to $1,280, representing increases of 75 to 80 percent.
• DHS would also eliminate the current $380 reduced fee option for low-income applicants and end fee waiver eligibility for both Form N-400 and Form N-336.
• Public comments on the proposed rule must be submitted within sixty days of publication in the Federal Register.

If finalized, the proposed rule would raise the Form N-400 (Application for Naturalization) filing fee by approximately 75 percent and eliminate both the reduced fee option and fee waivers for naturalization-related forms.

USCIS is primarily funded by fees charged to applicants and petitioners filing immigration benefit requests. According to DHS, the current fees for Form N-400 (Application for Naturalization) and Form N-336 (Request for a Hearing on a Decision in Naturalization Proceedings) do not recover the full costs associated with adjudicating these forms. DHS states that this cost/revenue gap—estimated at over $636 million annually for Form N-400 alone—has required the agency to raise fees for other immigration benefit requests to make up the difference.

The proposed rule includes three principal changes. First, DHS proposes to increase the fee for Form N-400 to $1,330 for paper filings and $1,280 for online filings, representing a 75 to 80 percent increase over the current fees of $760 and $710, respectively. Second, DHS proposes to increase the fee for Form N-336 to $1,475 for paper filings and $1,425 for online filings, representing a 78 to 83 percent increase. Third, DHS would eliminate the reduced fee option for Form N-400 (currently $380 for applicants with household income at or below 400 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines) and end fee waiver eligibility for both forms.

DHS justifies these increases under the “beneficiary-pays” principle, which holds that those who receive a government service should bear the cost of that service. The agency argues that prior administrations kept naturalization fees artificially low to encourage naturalization, effectively shifting costs to other immigration benefit requestors. DHS now takes the position that applicants for other immigration benefits—such as employment-based visas and family-based petitions—should not have to subsidize the cost of processing naturalization applications. According to DHS, the proposed fees are designed to ensure full cost recovery for the adjudication of Forms N-400 and N-336, consistent with DHS’s statutory authorities under Section 286(m) and Section 344 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).

Notably, the proposed rule would maintain the current fee exemptions for qualifying current and former armed forces service members who apply for naturalization under Sections 328 or 329 of the INA, as these exemptions are required by statute. Additionally, DHS is not proposing changes to the existing $50 discount for online filings.

Next Steps

DHS notes that this proposed rule is being issued separately from, and in advance of, a comprehensive fee schedule revision. The agency has indicated that the naturalization fee increases proposed here could potentially limit increases to other USCIS forms in future comprehensive fee rules—a consideration relevant to employers that regularly file employment-based petitions and applications.

The proposed rule is subject to a sixty-day public comment period. Employers and  stakeholders that wish to weigh in on the potential effects of the fee increases may submit comments before the deadline. Once all comments are reviewed and considered, DHS will decide whether to implement the fees as proposed, revise the proposed fees, or take no action to change the fees.

Ogletree Deakins’ Immigration Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Immigration blog as additional information becomes available.

For more insight into this development and other critical immigration issues facing employers today, please join our Virtual Immigration Insights Symposium on Wednesday, October 7, 2026, from noon to 2:30 p.m. ET. Register here.

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Quick Hits

• AI-enabled dashcams, facility surveillance cameras, and other safety and productivity monitoring tools can trigger data privacy obligations that vary by state.
• A manufacturer’s compliance obligations do not depend on what the tool is called or how it is described, but on whether it collects sensitive data types, monitors workers, or generates outputs that feed into employment decisions.
• Applicable law often demands manufacturers develop compliance strategies before these tools are deployed, not retrofit the strategies after regulatory enforcement or litigation forces the issue.

The question is not whether manufacturers may use these tools—they can. The question is what steps they must take before they begin using the tools and how they can ensure compliance with applicable law as they use them. Manufacturers are required to develop and leverage a state-aware compliance strategy built around three questions for each new tool: what data is collected, what does the system do with the data, and how is the tool’s output used in the workplace?

Your Cameras May Be Doing More Than You Think

Driver-facing artificial intelligence (AI) dashcams marketed for fleet safety are now standard in many commercial and industrial fleets. Likewise, surveillance cameras that identify individual workers on the floor for timekeeping or safety purposes, or track time-on-task for productivity and work assignment purposes, are becoming increasingly commonplace. But these technologies are not just safety and workforce management tools. Because they, in some instances, could be considered to use biometric data, they can trigger more onerous legal requirements in certain states.

Four states, Colorado, Illinois, Texas, and Washington, have implemented biometric-specific privacy laws. Although each law varies, common requirements include:

• Consent: Obtaining express, informed consent from individuals prior to obtaining or utilizing their biometric data. The authorization process generally requires a signed, written acknowledgment that discloses the purpose of collection and retention timelines, among other things.
• Data Protection and Security: Organizations must establish adequate safeguards (including vendor diligence and contractual terms), to shield biometric data from improper access or misappropriation.
• Restrictions on Data Disclosures: These statutes broadly bar organizations from selling, leasing, disclosing, or profiting from an individual’s biometric data without their authorization.
• Data Retention: Biometric privacy statutes typically establish a ceiling for how long organizations may maintain biometric data.

Certain of these laws also require the preparation of a written biometric privacy policy that describes the business’s practices with respect to the data.

Accordingly, manufacturers operating in these high-risk jurisdictions will want to treat the deployment of these tools as an operational decision requiring legal and security review, not just a hardware purchase. Before deploying AI-enabled dashcams or surveillance cameras, it would be appropriate for the company to conduct a deployment analysis to confirm whether the system captures or uses biometric data. If so, the deployment analysis likely needs to go further, which would include evaluating the use case and vendor security assessment, developing a strategy for obtaining and recording consent and retaining tool outputs, and clearly determining how the tool’s outputs will be used to identify further compliance obligations that should be met before the tool is rolled out to the workforce.

Tracking Productivity? There Are Rules for That

Technology that tracks keystrokes, idle time, work pace, and task completion rates are increasingly used for both administrative staff and floor workers. These tools, however, implicate a growing set of state laws that privacy-conscious employers cannot afford to ignore. Currently, four states have implemented laws specific to the electronic monitoring of employees.

Connecticut requires employers that engage in any type of electronic monitoring to give prior written notice to all affected employees and to post that notice in a conspicuous place readily available for viewing, though an exception exists where the employer has reasonable grounds to believe employees are engaged in conduct that violates the law, violates the legal rights of the employer or its employees, or creates a hostile workplace environment.

Delaware prohibits employers from monitoring telephone conversations, electronic mail, electronic transmission, or internet access or usage unless they either provide an electronic notice at least once daily or give a one-time written notice acknowledged by the employee, with an exception for processes designed solely for computer system maintenance or protection that are not targeted at a particular individual.

New York requires prior written notice upon hiring to all employees subject to electronic monitoring, along with a conspicuous workplace posting, and mandates that employees be advised and acknowledge that all telephone conversations, electronic mail, and internet access may be subject to monitoring at any time by any lawful means.

New York and Delaware limit their respective definitions of “employer” to entities with a place of business in the state, and the definitions feature a similar exception for nontargeted system maintenance processes.

Finally, Maine recently enacted its own employee monitoring law, which requires employers to, among other things, provide employees with written or electronic notice before engaging in electronic activities, further expanding the trend of state-level regulation in this space.

These laws should be construed broadly as likely applicable to a wide array of technologies given the complexity of modern devices and the quickly evolving nature of these regulations, and there is a high likelihood that future state legislation across the country will further restrict what is considered permissible employer monitoring. Accordingly, manufacturers that are planning to use monitoring tools in these jurisdictions must ensure employees are on notice of the tools they will use.

Automated Decisions, Real Legal Requirements

In addition to biometric functionalities, AI-enabled tools frequently utilized by manufacturers often implicate decision-making functionalities. As such, the use of these tools often implicates state AI laws, including the following:

• California: California’s Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) regulations bring automated-decision tools used in hiring under state anti-discrimination law, make bias testing relevant to liability, and require extended recordkeeping. The California Consumer Privacy Act’s (CCPA) automated decision-making technology (“ADMT”) regulations separately govern the use of automated decision-making technology for significant decisions, and require pre-use notice, the recognition of new data subject rights, and the completion of a risk assessment.
• Colorado: The revised Colorado AI Act (effective January 1, 2027) requires deployers of covered ADMTs to give clear pre-use notice, post-adverse outcome disclosure within thirty days, and (on request) data correction instructions and meaningful human review where commercially reasonable.
• Connecticut: Connecticut’s comprehensive AI law, signed May 29, 2026, covers “automated employment-related decision technology,” including any computation-based tool generating predictions, recommendations, rankings, or scores that make or materially influence employment decisions. Employers must disclose in plain language when applicants interact with automated technology and provide written pre-decision notice identifying the tool, its purpose, the data analyzed, and contact information.
• Illinois: Illinois recently amended its Human Rights Act to make discriminatory-effect AI use in employment a civil rights violation, regardless of intent, and to require notice when AI is used in employment decisions.
• New York City: Local Law 144 bars use of an automated employment decision tool unless a bias audit is completed and required pre-use notices are provided.
• Texas: The Texas Responsible Artificial Intelligence Governance Act prohibits intentionally discriminatory AI use but does not impose disclosure mandates and requires more than disparate impact alone to prove a violation.

What It Means for Manufacturers

Manufacturers deploying AI-enabled monitoring and decision tools may want to consider inventorying every system that touches workers, map each to the states and worker groups it effects, and build a state-by-state notice-and-consent matrix that addresses biometric collection, electronic monitoring, and automated decisions. Manufacturers may want to review their vendor contracts to ensure they allocate responsibility for consent, privacy notices, retention, and security. And, vendor diligence should be supplemented whenever new features are enabled. Most importantly, manufacturers may want to define when AI outputs may inform employment decisions, train supervisors not to treat AI scores as self-proving facts, and retain the documentation that shows their compliance work, including risk assessments, bias-testing records, notices, and consents. The manufacturers best positioned to use these tools are those that can explain, tool by tool and state by state, what each system collects, what it decides, and how the company prevents a tool from becoming an unlawful employment decision engine.

Ogletree Deakins’ Cybersecurity and Privacy Practice Group and Technology Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Cybersecurity and Privacy, Manufacturing, and Technology blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• The South Carolina Supreme Court recently held that an employer was not liable on theories of negligent hiring, supervision, or retention regarding an employee who had already been granted criminal immunity under the state’s “castle doctrine” after fatally shooting a customer during a workplace confrontation.
• The court’s reasoning centered on a critical distinction: when an employee’s use of force is determined to be lawful and justified, there is no “underlying wrongful conduct” to which any independent negligent acts of the employer could relate.
• The decision can serve as a prompt for employers to evaluate their workplace violence prevention programs.

The court held that because the employee had already been granted criminal immunity under South Carolina’s Protection of Persons and Property Act (the state’s “castle doctrine” statute), the employer could not be held civilly liable.

Background

The case arose from a September 2020 incident at Green’s Grocery in Charleston. David Wilson, a customer, entered the store to buy a phone charger. A heated confrontation ensued between Wilson and Suhib Yousef, an employee and the nephew of the store’s owner. The dispute escalated, Wilson’s conduct placed Yousef in reasonable fear of imminent serious injury, and Yousef shot and killed Wilson.

Yousef was charged with murder, but after an immunity hearing, the circuit court found that Wilson’s actions gave Yousef the statutory right to use lethal force under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. The court dismissed the murder charge, and the state did not appeal.

The Civil Suit

Following the criminal case, Wilson’s estate filed a civil lawsuit against Green’s Grocery, LLC, and its owner, seeking to hold the employer liable on theories such as negligent hiring, supervision, or retention—separate from Yousef’s personal justification for using force. The circuit court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the unchallenged immunity order established that Yousef was not at fault and that the employer could not be held liable where the underlying act was lawful.

The Supreme Court’s Analysis

On appeal, the supreme court affirmed. The court’s reasoning centered on a critical distinction: when an employee’s use of force is determined to be lawful and justified, there is no “underlying wrongful conduct” to which any independent negligent acts of the employer could relate.

The court acknowledged prior case law—Woodell by Allen v. Marion School District One and Greenville Memorial Auditorium v. Martin—in which employers were held not immune despite third-party criminal acts. In those cases, the plaintiffs’ claims were based on the employers’ own negligence, and the underlying third-party conduct was wrongful. The court distinguished Moore, explaining that Yousef’s conduct “was not criminal—nor was it wrongful in any respect.” Because there was no wrongful act at the foundation of the case, independent negligence claims against the employer could not attach.

As the court succinctly stated, “[t]his case, at its core, rises and falls with the justification for the shooting.”

Key Takeaways for Employers

The Moore v. Green’s Grocery decision breaks new ground at the intersection of employer liability and South Carolina’s self-defense statutes.

First, an employee’s grant of criminal immunity under the Protection of Persons and Property Act can have preclusive effects in subsequent civil litigation against the employer. Where a court has determined that the employee acted lawfully, a plaintiff faces a steep obstacle in seeking to hold the employer independently liable.

Second, the opinion does not give employers a blanket pass. The court carefully distinguished cases in which an employer’s own negligence—such as negligent hiring or failure to maintain safe premises—contributed to injury caused by a third party’s wrongful acts. Where the underlying act is unlawful, an employer’s independent negligence can still support liability.

Workplace Violence: The Practical Dimension

While Moore may offer legal comfort, it can also serve as a prompt for employers to think proactively about workplace violence. The castle doctrine shielded the employer here because the employee’s use of force was found lawful—but that outcome turned on specific facts, including an unchallenged immunity order. Murkier circumstances could yield a very different result.

Employers may want to use this decision as an occasion to evaluate workplace violence prevention programs. De-escalation training, clear use-of-force policies, and protocols for handling confrontational customers are critical. South Carolina employers that permit employees to carry firearms may want to develop policies that account for the interplay between the Protection of Persons and Property Act and potential employer liability.

Even a legally favorable outcome does not insulate a business from reputational harm, operational disruption, or the human toll of workplace violence. Prevention remains far more valuable than any after-the-fact legal defense.

Looking Ahead

Moore v. Green’s Grocery clarifies that the state’s castle doctrine immunity can extend beyond the individual who used force to shield the employer—but only where a court has affirmatively found the employee’s conduct justified. This ruling is a usefulcatalyst for reviewing workplace violence policies, training programs, and use-of-force protocols.

Ogletree Deakins’ South Carolina offices and Workplace Violence Prevention Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Retail, South Carolina, Workplace Safety and Health, and Workplace Violence Prevention blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• Regulatory inspections and investigations under Ontario’s Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) take several forms, including proactive and reactive visits by Ministry of Labour, Immigration, Training and Skills Development (MOL) inspectors who are empowered to enforce compliance with the OHSA and protect worker health and safety.
• MOL inspectors have broad enforcement powers, including entering a workplace without a warrant or prior notice.
• Beyond the obligations established by the OHSA on employers while the MOL exercises its enforcement powers, there are important additional steps for employers to consider depending on the purpose and depth of the inquiry, including whether the investigation is a result of a critical injury or fatality in the workplace.

• In Binance, the Ontario Court of Appeal ruled that the OSC summons were overbroad and violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because it required the company to produce documents that OSC had no foundation to believe may be relevant to an investigation it was conducting.
• The analysis in Binance provides a framework for employers to push back on overly broad production demands by regulatory bodies.

Occupational Health and Safety Regulatory Scheme in Ontario

Regulatory inspections and investigations under Ontario’s Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) take several forms—such as proactive inspections, complaint-driven inquiries, and post-incident reviews—all carried out by Ministry of Labour, Immigration, Training and Skills Development (MOL) inspectors who are empowered to enforce compliance with the OHSA and protect worker health and safety.

To carry out these functions, inspectors are vested with broad statutory powers, including the following:

• Inspectors may, among other things, enter any workplace at any time without a warrant or prior notice, question any person relevant to an investigation, seize and copy documents and records, test equipment and machinery, take photographs and require that a workplace remain undisturbed for a reasonable period.
• Where there are reasonable grounds to believe an offence has been committed, inspectors may also obtain investigative warrants from a justice of the peace or provincial judge authorizing the inspector to use any investigative technique or procedure or to do anything described in the warrant.
• In exigent circumstances, an inspector may exercise seizure powers without a warrant.

The OHSA establishes obligations on workplace parties while the MOL exercises its enforcement powers. For example, employers, among other parties, are required to co-operate with inspectors, and obstructing, hindering or providing false information to an inspector is itself an offence under the OHSA. Beyond the obligations established by the OHSA, there are important additional steps for employers to consider depending on the purpose and depth of the inquiry, such as whether the investigation is a result of a critical injury or fatality in the workplace.

Ontario Court of Appeal’s Decision

In Binance Holdings Limited, the Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a challenge to an investigative summons issued under the Securities Act. The OSC under section 13 of the Securities Act issued a broadly framed summons compelling Binance to produce documents and communications. Binance sought to challenge the summons on constitutional and statutory grounds.

On the merits, the court determined that section 8 of the Charter applied because an enforceable demand for production of business records is a seizure. Binance was entitled to protect the modest but reasonable expectation of privacy it has in its business documents from unreasonable seizure. Section 8 requires that compelled production be reasonable. The court affirmed that, even in the regulatory context, compelled production must be tied to the inquiry in progress. Regulatory bodies can compel documents that “may be relevant” to its inquiries, but those requests must not be broader than necessary for a “fishing expedition.”

The court stated that,

“… it only stands to reason that to be reasonable, a seizure must be related to the purpose for which the power of compulsion was created, and that if there is no realistic foundation for believing the target documents will be relevant to that inquiry, the seizure is not needed to facilitate a proper inquiry and is improper.”

Applying that standard, the court found the Binance summons unconstitutionally overbroad. In particular, a demand for “all communications” over a multiyear period among a wide array of individuals at Binance and its related entities, concerning Ontario or Canada generally, went far beyond any reasonable relevance to the stated investigation, amounting to an impermissible fishing expedition. The court set the summons aside and ordered the return of seized documents produced due to the invalid summons.

Relevance to Ontario’s Occupational Health and Safety Act

This decision provides a framework for employers responding to broad investigative demands from regulatory bodies such as the MOL, while recognizing the realities of the regulatory context.

First, scope and relevance constraints apply to compelled production in regulatory investigations. Although OHSA investigations also engage a reduced privacy expectation and may proceed without criminal law thresholds, section 8 still restricts compelled production to categories that may reasonably be relevant to the inquiry in progress. Overbroad demands untethered to the stated purpose risk being unreasonable and unconstitutional. Where an inspector’s demand or order sweeps in “all communications” or large classes of records without tailoring the demand, this decision supports insisting on narrower categories reasonably connected to the articulated safety inquiry, time period, individuals, and subject matter.

Second, regulators cannot justify fishing expeditions based on speculative relevance or generalized compliance concerns. The court rejected the argument that a regulatory body cannot know if a document is relevant without seeing it. For OHSA, that means MOL demands should delineate why the categories sought may bear on the incident, hazard, system, or alleged contravention under investigation.

The court’s insistence that administrative subpoenas or summonses be only as broad as necessary and targeted to what may be relevant provides employers a basis to resist unduly burdensome or unfocused demands, and if necessary, seek judicial intervention.

Ogletree Deakins’ Canada offices will continue to monitor developments and provide updates on the Canada, Cross-Border, and Workplace Safety and Health blogs as additional information becomes available.

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The changes—part of a broader EU simplification push following a provisional agreement reached between the Parliament, Council, and Commission on 7 May 2026—push back key compliance deadlines, introduce an outright ban on artificial intelligence (AI) tools used to generate nonconsensual intimate imagery, and resolve a long-standing overlap in the rules governing AI used in industrial machinery.

The EU Council still needs to sign off before any of this takes legal effect, but it is expected to do so before 2 August 2026. This article provides a broader cross-sector overview of the amendments. For more commentary on the implications for employers and HR teams specifically, please see our recent article, “EU Reaches Provisional Agreement to Delay Rules for AI Use in Employment Decisions.”

Quick Hits

• Key deadlines extended. For AI deployed in high-risk settings—e.g., hiring, education, law enforcement—the main compliance deadline shifts from 2 August 2026 to 2 December 2027. AI built into regulated products like medical devices and machinery gets until 2 August 2028.
• Certain apps are banned. AI systems generating nonconsensual intimate imagery or child sexual abuse material (CSAM) are outlawed from 2 December 2026. The ban covers both the companies that build these tools and those that deploy them.
• AI content labelling deadline extended. Tools already on the EU market before 2 August 2026 have until 2 December 2026 to add machine-readable labels identifying outputs as AI-generated.
• Machinery double-compliance resolved. AI-enabled machinery products will no longer need to satisfy both the EU AI Act and existing product safety laws simultaneously.

What Has Changed

Deferred Deadlines for High-Risk AI

The AI Act’s heaviest obligations fall on AI used in high-risk contexts. For employers, that principally means AI that is involved in recruitment decisions, performance evaluations, and access to essential services. Under Annex III to the AI Act, “high-risk” employment systems include AI used to place targeted job advertisements, filter applications, evaluate candidates, make decisions affecting employment terms, promotions, terminations, task allocation, and monitor or evaluate workers’ performance or behaviour. These requirements are now deferred by sixteen months—to 2 December 2027—largely because the industry technical standards that businesses need to benchmark compliance against are not yet ready. That is a legitimate reason for the extension, but it does not mean organisations can stand down. Enforcement bodies are already operational, a number of obligations are already live, and the original 2 August 2026 deadline stays on the books until the Council formally adopts this package.

Ban on ‘Nudifier’ Apps

From 2 December 2026, offering, selling, or using AI systems in the EU that generate realistic intimate imagery of an identifiable individual without the individual’s consent—or that produce CSAM—will be illegal. For tool developers, liability arises where this is the intended function or a foreseeable outcome without adequate safeguards; for businesses deploying third-party tools, liability arises where the tool is deliberately used for this purpose, including by disabling the developer’s own safety controls. The European Parliament’s co-rapporteur for the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee, put it plainly: these apps “impact real people, overwhelmingly women, with the purpose of humiliating, degrading and objectifying them.”

Other Changes

Manufacturers of AI-enabled machinery escape the dual-compliance burden that existed under the original text: going forward, they need only satisfy the relevant product safety rules, with AI-specific requirements to be folded into those rules by 2028. Separately, AI features that do no more than assist users or optimise performance will not automatically attract the heavier compliance obligations, unless a failure could create a health or safety risk. Businesses that need to use sensitive personal data to test their AI systems for bias now have a clearer (if tightly constrained) basis to do so. And the small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) compliance exemptions have been extended to cover a broader group of growing mid-sized businesses.

What This Means for Employers

The extended deadline matters most to organisations that use AI in hiring and workforce management—tools for screening candidates, assessing performance, or allocating work all fall squarely in the high-risk category. The extra time is welcome, but those who have not yet taken stock of their AI landscape should start now rather than treating December 2027 as the new starting gun. The rules banning the most harmful AI applications and requiring staff who work with AI to have an appropriate level of AI literacy are already in effect. Employers using a vendor’s AI system for employment purposes are also required to follow the vendor’s instructions for use, which vendors are legally obliged to provide—making vendor contract review an immediate practical priority.

Any business offering or deploying AI content-generation tools needs to pay attention to the nudifier ban. The 2 December 2026 deadline is under six months away. Tool developers should be auditing their systems now; deploying organisations should be reviewing their acceptable-use policies and checking what their vendor contracts actually say about liability for misuse. For more discussion of the compliance steps employers can take now in relation to high-risk employment AI, including a breakdown of the Annex III categories and human oversight obligations, see our previous article, “EU Reaches Provisional Agreement to Delay Rules for AI Use in Employment Decisions.”

Key Dates

• 2 August 2026: AI content labelling applies to new tools. Most remaining AI Act provisions take effect.
• 2 December 2026: Content labelling is extended to existing tools. The nudifier and CSAM ban takes effect.
• 2 December 2027: Full compliance is required for high-risk AI in employment, education, law enforcement, and similar settings.
• 2 August 2028: Full compliance is required for AI in regulated physical products such as medical devices and machinery.

Note: The extended deadlines above are not yet legally binding. The EU Council must still formally approve the text, and it must be published in the Official Journal of the European Union before it takes effect. Council approval is expected before 2 August 2026, at which point the original EU AI Act deadlines will be superseded.

Looking Ahead

This is a recalibration, not a retreat. The core framework of the EU AI Act is unchanged, and the speed with which the nudifier ban was added—responding directly to a series of high-profile incidents—shows that the EU legislature is prepared to act quickly when it sees a clear problem. As noted in our earlier article on this topic, the delay in compliance deadlines does not change the underlying obligations for high-risk workplace AI; it simply provides additional time to prepare. More Commission guidance is expected in the coming months, including practical examples to help businesses work out where their AI tools fall within the EU AI Act’s risk tiers.

Ogletree Deakins’ Cross-Border Practice Group, Cybersecurity and Privacy Practice Group, and Technology Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Cross-Border, Cybersecurity and Privacy, Employment Law, and Technology blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• A nonprofit has sued DOL under FOIA to compel disclosure of federal contractors’ 2021 and 2022 Type 2 EEO-1 data, the most recent reporting years targeted by such a request.
• The suit mirrors an earlier case in California, Center for Investigative Reporting v. U.S. Department of Labor, where the same type of FOIA request for contractor EEO-1 data led to disclosure of the 2016 through 2020 reports.
• The suit was filed as the EEOC moves to rescind the EEO-1 reporting requirement, meaning contractors that filed Type 2 reports for 2021 and 2022 may face pressure to disclose data even as the report itself heads toward elimination.

The suit follows more than two years of administrative delay and comes just months after a separate FOIA dispute resulted in the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs’ (OFCCP) release of 2016 through 2020 EEO-1 reports of federal contractors. The lawsuit signals that requests for workforce demographic data will continue even as the future of the EEO-1 reporting obligation itself remains unsettled.

The Lawsuit

As You Sow’s April 2024 FOIA request sought a spreadsheet of all consolidated (Type 2) EEO-1 reports for all federal contractors for 2021 and 2022. Type 2 reports consolidate a multi-establishment employer’s companywide workforce by job category, sex, and race or ethnicity, which permits analysis of a contractor’s overall demographic composition. As You Sow, which describes itself as a nonprofit organization seeking the records for educational, research, and noncommercial purposes, also requested a waiver of fees.

According to the complaint, the request followed a lengthy administrative process. DOL acknowledged the request and routed it to OFCCP. DOL also denied the fee waiver request, prompting a separate appeal that was eventually resolved in As You Sow’s favor. At one point, DOL told the requester that EEO-1 requests were under review to determine whether the agency could still process them following the revocation of Executive Order 11246, which had served as the legal foundation for OFCCP’s federal contractor compliance authority. The complaint further alleges that DOL’s Appeals Unit found OFCCP’s response still outstanding and remanded the matter to OFCCP for a response.

The complaint alleges that, more than two years after the request was filed and acknowledged, As You Sow has received no records and no indication of when any records will be produced. As You Sow asserts that it has exhausted its administrative remedies and that DOL is improperly withholding records to which it has a statutory right of access. The complaint seeks a declaration that DOL’s failure to disclose is unlawful, an injunction against continued withholding, and an award of costs and attorneys’ fees.

A Familiar Path: The Center for Investigative Reporting Litigation

The As You Sow complaint follows the same theory advanced in earlier litigation over contractor EEO-1 data. The Center for Investigative Reporting (CIR) sued DOL in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California over a FOIA request for contractors’ 2016 through 2020 Type 2 reports, alleging that DOL violated FOIA by failing to notify the requester of a determination and failing to disclose the records.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that EEO-1 Type 2 workforce demographic data is not protected commercial information under FOIA Exemption 4, affirming the district court’s order compelling disclosure. The ruling addressed only the 2016 through 2020 reports and did not resolve objections based on contractor status or jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit’s decision is not binding on the District of Columbia court, but its reasoning could carry persuasive weight if DOL raises Exemption 4 as a defense in the As You Sow case.

After the government declined to seek rehearing, OFCCP released the withheld data in February 2026, beginning with five bellwether objectors and extending to the remaining objecting contractors on February 25, 2026.

The EEOC’s Proposed Rescission

The lawsuit also arrives as the federal government moves to end EEO-1 reporting. On May 14, 2026, EEOC submitted a proposed rule to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) that would rescind the EEO-1 reporting requirement, along with the EEO-2 through EEO-5 reports. OIRA concluded its review on June 9, 2026, clearing the way for EEOC to publish the proposed rule in the Federal Register, where it will be open for public comment before EEOC can issue any final rule.

The rescission is not yet in effect. Until EEOC completes the rulemaking process, covered employers’ existing obligation to collect and report EEO-1 workforce demographic data remains in force, and employers may wish to be prepared to file if EEOC opens a 2026 filing window. If finalized, however, the rescission would end a reporting obligation that has been in place since 1966, while requesters such as As You Sow continue to seek data already submitted under that obligation.

Next Steps

The As You Sow complaint confirms that contractor EEO-1 data remains a focus of FOIA requesters. Federal contractors that filed Type 2 reports for 2021 and 2022 may want to monitor this matter, review how their organizations have historically treated EEO-1 data as confidential, and consider how a potential disclosure could intersect with their broader compliance strategies.

Ogletree Deakins’ Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Compliance Practice Group, Government Contracting and Compliance Practice Group, and Workforce Analytics and Compliance Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Compliance, Employment Law, Government Contracting and Compliance, and Workforce Analytics and Compliance blogs as additional information becomes available.

This article and more information on how the Trump administration’s actions impact employers can be found on Ogletree Deakins’ Administration Resource Hub.

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