Quick Hits

• A Massachusetts federal court granted a preliminary injunction halting enforcement of the ACTS survey against public institutions in seventeen plaintiff states, finding plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their claim that the promulgation and adoption of the survey was arbitrary and capricious.
• The court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that the ACTS survey exceeds NCES’s statutory authority and that it violates the Paperwork Reduction Act, affirming that NCES has broad authority to collect disaggregated demographic data and that the statute does not bar its use for enforcement referrals.
• The court found the promulgation and adoption of the ACTS survey was arbitrary and capricious because NCES abandoned its established deliberative process solely to meet an unexplained 120-day presidential deadline and “‘entirely failed’” to consider the simultaneous dismantling of ED.
• The injunction is limited to the seventeen plaintiff states and their constituent public institutions; institutions outside those states remain subject to the ACTS survey requirements absent separate judicial relief.

Background

The underlying lawsuit, Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Education, was filed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and sixteen other states against the ED, the secretary of education, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and its director, challenging the approval and implementation of the ACTS survey as unlawful. The ACTS survey, which institutions of higher education were initially required to complete by March 18, 2026, significantly expands the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data collection. The survey requires institutions to report admissions, aid, and outcomes data disaggregated by race, sex, test scores, GPA, income, and other factors for the current academic year, and, for the first time in IPEDS history, six prior years (2019–20 through 2024–25).

In August 2025, President Donald Trump directed the secretary of education to expand the scope of IPEDS reporting within 120 days to track race-conscious admissions practices following the Supreme Court of the United States 2023 ’decision in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College. Secretary of Education Linda McMahon then directed NCES to collect the data within that same 120-day timeline. After abbreviated notice-and-comment periods, OMB approved the ACTS, and ED opened the survey on December 18, 2025.

On March 11, 2026, plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting three claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA): (1) that the ACTS exceeds NCES’s statutory authority, (2) that it violates the Paperwork Reduction Act and the E-Government Act of 2002, and (3) that it was proposed and adopted arbitrarily and capriciously. The court issued a series of temporary restraining orders extending the ACTS survey deadline while briefing proceeded. Following a March 24, 2026, hearing, the court treated plaintiffs’ motion as one seeking a preliminary injunction.

The Court’s Ruling

The court found that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their statutory authority and PRA claims.

On statutory authority, the court held that the ACTS survey “fits comfortably” within NCES’s authority under 20 U.S.C. § 9543(a)(3) to collect disaggregated data by race, ethnicity, and similar characteristics. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that the survey’s potential use for enforcement referrals rendered it non-neutral, reasoning that “one of the primary reasons for the government to seek data broken down by race and ethnicity … is to ascertain whether the data shows a potential pattern of racial discrimination” and that the statute contains no prohibition on using IPEDS data for enforcement referrals. The court also rejected the argument that only the Office of Civil Rights could receive compliance-related data, finding that NCES is not barred from collecting such information in the first instance.

On the PRA claim, the court concluded that the statute requires only that an agency certify compliance and provide a supporting record, not that a court independently determine whether the agency substantively complied with the PRA’s requirements.

The court found a strong likelihood of success on the arbitrary and capricious claim, identifying two principal deficiencies.

First, the court found that NCES abandoned the deliberate, multistep process it had historically used to implement IPEDS changes, including technical review panels, stakeholder collaboration, and pilot testing, solely to meet an unexplained 120-day presidential deadline. Neither the president, the secretary, nor the agency ever provided a reasoned explanation for the compressed timeline.

The agency dismissed all alternatives raised by commenters, including pilot years, and phased collections, as “infeasible” based solely on the timeline, without explaining why the deadline existed or why the alternatives could not be adopted. The court emphasized that the problem was not simply that there was a deadline, but rather that the agency rejected multiple concerns and alternatives “solely in order to achieve an arbitrary and unexplained deadline.”

Second, the court found that NCES entirely failed to consider the simultaneous dismantling of the ED. At the time the ACTS survey was being implemented, NCES had reduced its staff from approximately one hundred employees to as few as three or thirteen, and the IPEDS team went from eight staff members to three.

The agency never acknowledged the staff reductions, never explained how its diminished workforce would manage the expanded workload, and never addressed what would happen to the data once NCES ceases to exist. The court characterized the agency’s dismantlement as “an important aspect of the problem” that the agency “entirely failed to consider.”

The court found irreparable harm based on the administrative burden on institutions, which were forced to restructure data-collection systems and divert resources from essential functions such as financial aid, scholarship awards, and accreditation. The court also credited the risk of enforcement actions arising from inconsistent or inaccurate data submissions caused by unclear definitions and compressed timelines, noting that federal regulation authorizes fines of up to $71,545 per violation. The court deferred ruling on student privacy issues.

The balance of equities and public interest favored relief, with the court citing a strong public interest in restraining arbitrary exercises of federal power and relieving public universities of unnecessary burdens.

Scope of Relief

The preliminary injunction is limited to the seventeen plaintiff states: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin, and their constituent public institutions. The court declined to issue universal or nationwide relief, noting that plaintiffs themselves did not seek it. The order was issued under both 5 U.S.C. § 705 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65 and is without prejudice to further modification. The court also ordered plaintiffs to retain all records responsive to the ACTS survey for the duration of the litigation.

Next Steps

Two motions to intervene, filed by the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts (AICUM), remain pending, with a hearing scheduled for April 13, 2026. Institutions outside the seventeen plaintiff states remain subject to the ACTS survey requirements absent separate judicial relief, although the court’s finding on the arbitrary-and-capricious claim may encourage additional challenges by other states or institutional groups.

Higher education institutions may wish to monitor developments in this litigation and assess their compliance posture in light of this order. Institutions within the seventeen plaintiff states may wish to note the record-retention obligation and consider how to preserve all data responsive to the ACTS survey.

Ogletree Deakins’ Higher Education Practice Group and Workforce Analytics and Compliance Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Compliance, Government Contracting and Reporting, Higher Education, State Developments, and Workforce Analytics and Compliance blogs as additional information becomes available.

This article and more information on how the Trump administration’s actions impact employers can be found on Ogletree Deakins’ Administration Resource Hub.

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Quick Hits

• The Massachusetts Superior Court held that the PFMLA’s anti-retaliation protections impose obligations only on “employers” as defined in the unemployment insurance statute, and do not extend liability to a corporate employer’s officers, agents, investors, or board members.
• The court distinguished the PFMLA from the Massachusetts Wage Act, which expressly deems corporate officers and agents to be “employers” of the corporation’s employees, language that is absent from the PFMLA.
• The court further rejected an aiding and abetting theory of PFMLA liability, noting that unlike Massachusetts’s anti-discrimination statute, which expressly provides for aiding and abetting liability in discrimination cases, the PFMLA contains no analogous provision, indicating the legislature did not intend to authorize such claims.
• The ruling appears to be one of the first decisions squarely addressing whether individual liability can attach under the PFMLA.

In its decision, Laughlin v. BinStar, Inc., the court also rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to assert PFMLA claims against the individual employee defendants on an aiding and abetting theory, reasoning that the legislature’s decision not to include an aiding and abetting provision, after having expressly provided for aiding and abetting liability in the Commonwealth’s anti-discrimination statute (M.G.L. c. 151B), indicated that it had not intended to provide a cause of action for aiding and abetting a PFMLA violation.

Background

The case arose out of the dissolution of BinStar, Inc., a Delaware-incorporated discount retail company that operated stores in Boston, Saugus, and Avon, Massachusetts. The plaintiff, Jackson Laughlin, co-founded BinStar and served as its president and CEO. Alpaca VC Fund III LP (Alpaca), a New York entity, was an investor in BinStar, and defendants Aubrie Pagano and Ryan Freedman, both affiliates of Alpaca, served on BinStar’s board to represent Alpaca’s interests.

During the summer of 2023, BinStar needed capital. Laughlin alleged that Alpaca exploited this opportunity to restructure BinStar, gaining significant corporate advantages, including acquiring veto power over BinStar’s budgets, debt, equity, mergers, and his role as CEO. By the spring of 2024, BinStar faced financial distress and insolvency, carrying over $1.3 million in debts. Laughlin alleged that Pagano and Freedman rejected a $4 million bridge investment and instead pursued a $1 million alternative on inferior terms.

These events, Laughlin alleged, “precipitated the collapse” of his physical and mental health. From mid-October 2024 through the end of February 2025, Laughlin took a leave of absence under the PFMLA. During his leave, Laughlin remained CEO of BinStar and no successor CEO was appointed. While he was on leave, Pagano and Freedman allegedly sent more than sixty-five messages demanding “CEO-level duties” from Laughlin, including signing dissolution consents, removing a former employee as a director, and giving administrative access to a 401(k) account. On November 22, 2024, BinStar filed for dissolution. That same day, Freedman allegedly disclosed the details of Laughlin’s PFMLA leave to a former employee and his counsel as “a retaliatory act” to undermine Laughlin’s credibility.

Laughlin filed suit and asserted, among other claims, a claim for violation of the PFMLA against Pagano and Freedman, alleging that the barrage of messages during his leave violated the PFMLA. Pagano and Freedman moved to dismiss, arguing that they were not “employers” under the PFMLA and therefore could not be held individually liable.

The Superior Court’s Decision

The court began its analysis of the individual liability issue by examining the text of the PFMLA, observing that the PFMLA makes it “‘unlawful for any employer to retaliate by discharging, firing, suspending, expelling, disciplining …, threatening or in any other manner discriminating against an employee for’” exercising PFMLA leave rights, and provides aggrieved employees with a private right of action for violating that provision. (Emphasis and alteration added by the court). Critically, the court noted, the PFMLA incorporates the definitions of “employer” and “employee” set out in § 1 of M.G.L. c. 151A, the unemployment insurance statute, which defines an “employer” as “any employing unit,” that is, “any individual or type of organization … who or which has or … had one or more individuals performing services for him or it” in Massachusetts.

The court then noted a key distinction between the PFMLA and the Massachusetts Wage Act. Unlike the Massachusetts Wage Act, which expressly provides that “[t]he president and treasurer of a corporation and any officers or agents having the management of such corporation shall be deemed to be the employers of the employees of the corporation,” the PFMLA contains no such language extending liability to individual officers, agents, investors, or board members. “Because no such language is used in Chapter 151A or the PFML statute,” the court ruled, “I decline to import it.” Based on that ruling, the court held that the obligations and prohibitions created by the PFMLA “rest on the employer” and “may not be enforced against investors or board members.”

The court also addressed and rejected Laughlin’s alternative argument that he should be permitted to amend his complaint to assert a claim for aiding and abetting a PFMLA violation. While acknowledging that a corporation may only act through its employees, agents, officers, or directors, the court reasoned that the PFMLA, in contrast to the Massachusetts Wage Act, does not impose liability on those individual actors. The court also noted that the cases cited by Laughlin concerned discrimination claims arising under M.G.L. c. 151B, which expressly provides for aiding and abetting liability: “It shall be an unlawful practice … [f]or any person, whether an employer or an employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the acts forbidden under this chapter or to attempt to do so.” The absence of similar language in the PFMLA, the court concluded, “indicates the legislature did not intend to provide liability for aiding and abetting a violation of the PFMLA statute.”

Accordingly, the court dismissed with prejudice Laughlin’s PFMLA claim against Pagano and Freedman.

Key Takeaways

The Laughlin decision is significant because it appears to be one of the first rulings to squarely address whether the PFMLA imposes individual liability on persons other than the corporate employer. In holding that it does not, the court applied a straightforward textual analysis, contrasting the PFMLA’s silence on individual liability with the express language found in both the Massachusetts Wage Act and M.G.L. c. 151B. This interpretive framework, relying on the legislature’s deliberate omission of individual liability and aiding and abetting provisions, is likely to be influential in future PFMLA litigation.

For employers, the decision reinforces that PFMLA obligations run to the corporate entity, not to individual officers, directors, or investors. Notably, the court expressly declined to address whether Laughlin had stated a viable PFMLA claim against BinStar itself, noting that the corporate employer had not filed a motion to dismiss that claim. Employers may want to continue to ensure that they comply fully with the PFMLA’s requirements, including its anti-retaliation provision, which continue to apply to employers.

For individual officers, directors, and investors, the decision provides welcome clarity. Although the ruling comes from the Superior Court and is not binding appellate authority, its thorough statutory analysis and its issuance from the Business Litigation Session give it persuasive weight.

The decision also highlights the ongoing patchwork of individual liability standards across Massachusetts employment statutes. The Massachusetts Wage Act expressly extends liability to corporate officers and agents, and M.G.L. c. 151B expressly provides for aiding and abetting liability. The PFMLA, by contrast, contains neither provision.

Ogletree Deakins’ Boston office will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Massachusetts and Leaves of Absence blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• As of January 1, 2026, Connecticut employers with eleven or more employees must provide paid sick leave to all nonseasonal workers, with full expansion to employers of any size expected by January 1, 2027.
• Connecticut’s Paid Family and Medical Leave maximum weekly benefit rose to $1,016.40 in 2026 while the employee contribution rate remains unchanged at 0.5 percent of wages.
• Connecticut employers may want to audit exempt employee classifications in light of the state’s $16.94 minimum wage, as the narrow gap with the federal FLSA salary threshold may create wage-and-hour exposure for employees who do not qualify for a Connecticut white-collar or outside sales exemption.

Expanded Coverage Under Connecticut Paid Sick Leave

As of January 1, 2026, employers with eleven or more employees in Connecticut are required to provide paid sick leave for qualifying reasons to all employees in the state, excluding seasonal workers. The phased expansion continues, and by January 1, 2027, employers with just one or more employees in the state will be covered. The employee count threshold is determined by the company’s payroll for the week containing January 1, but guidance provided by the Connecticut Department of Labor confirms that it counts only employees in the state of Connecticut.

Employers newly “inducted” under the law may want to confirm that accrual, carryover, usage, and notice provisions are reflected in handbooks and payroll systems. For multistate employers, this may require revisiting existing policies to ensure Connecticut-specific compliance.

Higher Connecticut Paid Family and Medical Leave Benefits

Benefits under the Connecticut Paid Family and Medical Leave program increased for 2026 based on updated wage calculations. The total maximum weekly benefit is now sixty times the minimum wage. This means that the maximum weekly benefit increases to $1,016.40 (from $981) as of January 1, 2026.

Significantly, the employee contribution rate remains unchanged at 0.5 percent of wages. While payroll deductions stay the same, employers may see increased utilization given the enhanced benefit levels.

The Exemption ‘Trap’: Minimum Wage vs. Salary Threshold

Connecticut continues to present wage-and-hour challenges. The state’s minimum wage increased to $16.94 per hour on January 1, 2026. At the same time, the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) salary threshold for the executive, administrative, and professional exemptions remains $684 per week.

Here is where the math matters:

• $684 per week ÷ 40 hours = $17.10 per hour equivalent
• Connecticut minimum wage = $16.94 per hour

That narrow margin may raise questions worth examining, but the analysis is not as straightforward as it might first appear. Connecticut law defines certain exemption categories, including executive, administrative, and professional (i.e., “white-collar”) and outside sales exemptions, by excluding those employees from the statutory definition of “employee” for purposes of the state’s wage-and-hour laws. As a result, employees who properly qualify for one of those white-collar exemptions under Connecticut law are not subject to the state’s minimum wage or overtime requirements in the first place, and the math above would not create minimum wage exposure for those workers.

The picture may be different for other types of exemptions that do not carry the same blanket exclusion from Connecticut’s wage-and-hour statutes. For employees exempt from overtime under the FLSA but not falling within one of Connecticut’s white-collar or outside sales exclusions, the gap between the federal salary threshold and the state minimum wage could become meaningful. An employee in that situation who works additional hours could see an effective regular rate that drops below $16.94, potentially creating state minimum wage exposure.

Connecticut’s exemption framework can be complex, and the interplay between state and federal classifications is not always intuitive. Federal exempt status does not automatically resolve state-law wage-and-hour obligations for every exemption category.

As part of any spring compliance audit, employers may want to revisit exempt classifications, salary levels, and timekeeping practices, i.e.,paying particular attention to which specific exemption applies under Connecticut law and whether it carries the same scope of exclusion as the white-collar exemptions. In Connecticut, these distinctions can quickly become significant wage-and-hour problems.

Ogletree Deakins’ Stamford office will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Connecticut, Leaves of Absence, and Wage and Hour blogs as additional information becomes available. Further information can be found in the Ogletree Deakins Client Portal, including minimum wage and minimum wage tip credit law summaries. (Full law summaries are available for Premium-level subscribers; Snapshots and Updates are available for all registered client-users.) For more information on the Client Portal or a Client Portal subscription, please reach out to clientportal@ogletree.com.

Quick Hits

• ViaQuest Residential Services recently agreed to pay $975,000 to settle claims it misclassified program managers as exempt from overtime under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Ohio’s wage laws.
• The case, Simmons v. ViaQuest Residential Services LLC, No. 2:23-00201 (S.D. Ohio), centered on whether program managers’ “primary duty” was management or direct patient care.
• One hundred-six plaintiffs opted in after conditional certification, illustrating how quickly liability can scale with companywide classification practices.
• Healthcare employers may want to consider auditing the actual duties of their program managers and similar frontline supervisors to ensure exempt classifications withstand scrutiny.

The Complaint

Kenneth Simmons filed suit in January 2023 on behalf of himself and similarly situated program managers at ViaQuest Residential Services, LLC, a company that provides home healthcare services, including support to individuals with developmental disabilities. Simmons alleged in the complaint that ViaQuest maintained a companywide policy of classifying program managers as salaried exempt employees and failing to pay overtime. Simmons alleged that program managers’ primary duties were nonexempt in nature—consisting largely of providing direct patient care—and that they did not qualify as “executive,” “administrative,” or “professional” employees under the FLSA’s white-collar exemptions. The complaint raised claims under the FLSA, the Ohio Wage Act, and the Ohio Prompt Pay Act, and alleged that ViaQuest’s violations were knowing and willful.

ViaQuest’s Answer

ViaQuest broadly denied the allegations, insisting its program managers were properly classified as exempt under both the FLSA’s “executive exemption” and “administrative exemption.” ViaQuest contended that program managers earned the required minimum salary, directed the work of at least two full-time employees, had hiring and firing authority, and exercised discretion and independent judgment on matters of significance. Even if program managers performed some nonexempt work, ViaQuest argued, their primary duty always remained management, and such work would have been done while multitasking. Under the FLSA, the term “primary duty” means “the principal, main, major, or most important duty that the employee performs.”

The Settlement

The court conditionally certified the collective action in April 2023, and 106 individuals opted in. After substantial discovery, the parties reached a settlement during their third mediation session in January 2026. The $975,000 fund covers all individual payments, service awards, attorney fees, and costs, with plaintiffs receiving pro rata payments representing approximately 76.4 percent of their calculated alleged unpaid overtime. ViaQuest continues to deny any wrongdoing.

Key Takeaways for Healthcare Employers

This case highlights the compliance risks healthcare companies face when they rely on program managers and similar frontline supervisors who carry supervisory titles but spend much of their time delivering hands-on patient care. The FLSA’s white-collar exemptions turn on actual duties, not job titles, and the more time a manager spends providing direct care—and to the extent to it is a reliable proxy for the “principal, main, major, or most important duty of the employee”—the harder it may be for an employer to argue that management is the “primary duty.”

Healthcare employers should consider auditing the actual day-to-day duties of frontline supervisors—not just job descriptions—to ensure exempt classifications can withstand scrutiny.

Ogletree Deakins’ Columbus office, Class Action Practice Group, Healthcare Industry Group, and Wage and Hour Practice Group will continue to monitor these issues and will provide updates on the Class Action, Healthcare, Ohio, and Wage and Hour blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• New Jersey lawmakers are currently considering several bills that would have significant implications for employers.
• Key proposals include the establishment of paid prenatal leave, an extension of pregnancy-related disability benefits, and amendments to ensure paid sick leave applies to employees bound by amendable collective bargaining agreements.

Here is a summary of some notable employment law bills currently under consideration.

Pregnancy-Related Employment Protections

Assembly Bill (A) 113—Concerns bereavement leave for miscarriage and stillbirth

This bill would amend the New Jersey Family Leave Act to include “the death of a child or miscarriage or stillbirth of a child” in the definition of job-protected “family leave.” The bill would also amend the definition of “family leave” to include “time to grieve.” The bill would allow employees to certify the leave by “stat[ing] the date of the death, miscarriage, or stillbirth.” The bill was introduced on January 13, 2026.

A4358—Expansion of pregnancy-related temporary disability

Under current law, employees are entitled to paid temporary disability benefits during the four weeks before their expected delivery date and the six weeks after their actual delivery date. This bill would expand the post-delivery pregnancy-related temporary disability leave benefits from the current six weeks to eight weeks. The bill was introduced on February 19, 2026.

A440—Establishes the “New Jersey Paid Prenatal Personal Leave Act”

This bill would require all New Jersey employers to provide every employee with up to twenty hours of paid prenatal leave (not to be confused with “parental” leave) each year, to be used during the employee’s pregnancy for pregnancy-related healthcare, including physical examinations, medical procedures, monitoring, and testing. Employees would be allowed to take leave in one-hour increments, to be paid at their regular rate of pay. It is unclear what documentation employers would be permitted to request to substantiate the need for prenatal leave, if any, as the bill provides that employers “shall not require the disclosure of confidential information relating to a mental or physical illness, injury, or condition as a condition of providing paid prenatal personal leave.” Employers would not be required to pay employees for unused paid prenatal personal leave after separation of employment. The bill was introduced on January 13, 2026.

A4704 / S2689—Accommodations for Breastfeeding Employees

This bill would amend the NJLAD to make it an unlawful employment practice to fail to accommodate a lactating employee by providing appropriate accommodations for as long as “the employee desires,” meaning however long the employee desires to lactate. These accommodations could include reasonable break time paid at the employee’s regular rate of compensation, job restructuring, and a modified work schedule for the purpose of milk expression. This bill also clarifies that the location the employer must provide the employee to express milk must be a suitable room “free from intrusion of other employees or customers of the employer’s business, if applicable, other than a restroom.” (Emphasis added.) Finally, the bill would add “breastfeeding” as a protected status under the equal pay provisions of the NJLAD. A4704 / S2689 was introduced on March 16, 2026.

Leaves of Absence

Senate Bill (S) 3510—Clarifying New Jersey’s Earned Sick Leave Law (ESLL)

Enacted in 2018, the ESLL provides most employees with up to forty hours of paid sick leave per year. The ESLL does not apply to employees “performing service in the construction industry” covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBAs) in effect when the law took effect until that CBA’s expiration. S3510 would ensure that the ESLL’s provisions apply to employees subject to amendable CBAs when those CBAs are amended. The bill was introduced on February 12, 2026.

Amendments to the NJLAD

A4563 / S1631—Height and weight discrimination

This bill would amend the NJLAD to expressly prohibit discrimination “because of the height or weight of any individual.” Exceptions include circumstances in which height and weight requirements are a “bona fide occupational qualification[s],” which generally means a requirement that an employee be of a certain height or weight because it is genuinely necessary for the business to run properly or for the employee to perform the job safely and effectively. A4563 / S1631 was introduced on January 13, 2026, and was passed by the New Jersey Senate on February 24, 2026. It is currently under consideration by the New Jersey General Assembly.

A4487 / S3779—Discrimination based on menstruation, perimenopause, and menopause

This bill would amend the NJLAD to make it an unlawful employment practice for employers to discriminate against employees on the basis of menstruation, perimenopause, or menopause, if symptoms of such conditions “substantially interfere with” employees’ abilities “to perform one or more job functions.” The legislation was introduced in the Assembly on February 24, 2026, and in the Senate on March 5, 2026.

A2041—The “New Jersey Intern Protection Act”

This bill seeks to provide legal protections and remedies for interns by adding them to the list of individuals protected by the NJLAD and the Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), which provides whistleblower protection to employees. The bill would provide interns with employment protections and allow them to bring actions against employers. The bill was introduced on January 13, 2026.

A767—Health benefits and female contraceptives

This bill would make it an unlawful employment practice under the NJLAD to exclude health insurance coverage for the purchase of “female contraceptives.” The bill includes exceptions for “religious employer[s],” defined as churches, associations of churches, and church-supported elementary or secondary schools, if the purchase of female contraceptives conflicts with their “bona fide religious beliefs and practices.” The bill was introduced on January 13, 2026.

A4194—Public Health Emergencies and States of Emergency

This bill would make it an unlawful employment practice for employers to require employees who are parents or guardians of a school-aged (K-12) child “to be physically present for work, when that work can be performed remotely, during the public health emergency and state of emergency declared by the Governor,” unless the employer can demonstrate that it would be an “undue hardship” on its business operations. There would be a “rebuttable presumption” that an employee can perform work remotely if the employee has already worked remotely for the lesser of either two consecutive pay periods or two weeks. That presumption can be rebutted with a “preponderance of the evidence showing that the employee cannot perform essential duties remotely.” The bill was introduced on February 19, 2026.

Wage and Hour

A4639 / S2105—Prohibition on training repayment agreements

This bill would prohibit employers from requiring employees and prospective employees to enter into a “training repayment agreement” as a condition of employment and make such agreements void and unenforceable. Such an agreement generally requires employees to reimburse the employer, a training provider, or another third party for the costs of providing training to the employee. The bill would exclude cash advances, payments for equipment purchased or leased by the employee, educational sabbatical leave contracts, and training repayment agreements made as part of a collective bargaining agreement. This bill was introduced in the New Jersey Senate on January 13, 2026, and in the General Assembly on March 10, 2026.

Employment Law

S3604—Exemptions to Domestic Workers’ Bill of Rights (DWBR)

This bill would amend the DWBR, which was enacted in 2024, to clarify that certain licensed or certified home health care workers and hospice care workers are not intended to be treated as “domestic workers” under the DWBR. The bill would exclude from the definition of “hiring entity” under the DWBR, home care service agencies, including health service firms, and licensed hospice care programs with respect to services performed by licensed workers. The bill was introduced on February 19, 2026.

A4414—Employment verifications

This bill would immunize employers from civil liability when an employer in good faith discloses information to a prospective employer “contained within the employee’s personnel file, including but not limited to” title, job qualifications, compensation, period of employment, attendance record, workplace accidents, and, if applicable, the reason for separation. Employers disclosing such information would be “presumed to be acting in good faith unless it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the employer acted with actual malice toward the employee or former employee.” The bill was introduced on February 19, 2026.

Next Steps

The New Jersey legislative session began on January 13, 2026, and runs until December 31, 2026. At this time, most of the bills above remain in early stages, and it is not clear which, if any, will pass. Still, the bills highlight the state legislature’s concerns and potential new compliance obligations for employers. Employers may want to keep their eyes on the progress of these and other bills.

Ogletree Deakins’ Morristown office will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the New Jersey blog as additional information becomes available.

In addition, the Ogletree Deakins Client Portal covers compliance updates in Leave, EEO, Wage and Hour, and other employment laws. If these laws are enacted, they will be included under the applicable topics and on the New Jersey jurisdiction page. Snapshots and updates are available for all registered client users. Premium and Advanced subscribers have access to detailed federal, state, and local law summaries, as well as related template documents. For more information on the Client Portal or a Client Portal subscription, please reach out to clientportal@ogletree.com.

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Quick Hits

• The Superior Court of Québec found that an arbitration award that had overturned the dismissal of a heavy vehicle driver for failure to accommodate was unreasonable, thereby reinstating the dismissal.
• The court opinion confirms that zero-tolerance policies for alcohol consumption constitute a legitimate standard that is reasonably necessary to ensure public safety.
• The duty to accommodate was not triggered because the automatic dismissal took effect before the employer became aware of the employee’s alcoholism.
• Even on the merits, there was no discrimination: the policy applied uniformly and the dismissal resulted from a voluntary act—any person, whether an alcoholic or an occasional drinker, would have faced the same consequence.

In 1641-9749 Québec inc. c. April (2026 QCCS 289), the presiding justice granted an application for judicial review to quash an arbitration award that had ordered the reinstatement of a long-haul truck driver dismissed after causing a traffic accident while severely intoxicated. The court concluded, on the one hand, that the duty to accommodate was not triggered because the employer was unaware of the employee’s alcoholism at the time the automatic dismissal took effect and, on the other hand, that a sanction imposed under a uniformly applied zero-tolerance policy grounded in public safety did not constitute discrimination. This decision sends a strong signal to employers across a range of industries regarding the scope and legitimacy of their zero-tolerance policies.

Background

On June 30, 2022, Yolaine Nadeau, a long-haul truck driver employed by 1641-9749 Québec inc. (Groupe Robert) for approximately twenty-four years, consumed at least nine cans of beer during a trip to Pennsylvania and then caused an accident with a blood alcohol level of 0.18 mg/100 ml—more than double the legal limit. The employer dismissed her in accordance with the zero-tolerance policy set out in the collective agreement, which provided for immediate dismissal for the consumption of alcohol or drugs while on duty.

In Teamsters Québec, local 106 et 1641-9749 Québec inc. (Yolaine Nadeau) (2023 QCTA 304), the grievance arbitrator overturned the dismissal, finding that alcoholism constituted a disability and that the employer should have undertaken a reasonable accommodation process before proceeding with termination.

The Superior Court Decision

On January 21, 2026, the Superior Court granted the application for judicial review and declared the arbitration award unreasonable. Among the court’s key findings:

• Date of dismissal. The dismissal took effect automatically on June 30, 2022 (the date of the accident), pursuant to Annex B of the collective agreement—not on August 31, 2022, as the arbitrator had found. At the date of the accident, the employer was unaware of the employee’s alcoholism.
• No discrimination. The zero-tolerance policy applied uniformly to all drivers. Ms. Nadeau was dismissed not because of her alcoholism, but because she voluntarily consumed alcohol in violation of a clear rule. Any person, whether an alcoholic or an occasional drinker, would have faced the same consequence.
• Alcoholism cannot be invoked after the misconduct. Alcohol dependence cannot be invoked after the commission of the misconduct to defeat the zero-tolerance policy. No evidence demonstrated that Ms. Nadeau lacked the capacity to make a choice regarding her consumption.
• Public safety prevails. Zero tolerance constitutes a justified standard that is reasonably necessary to ensure public safety—a factor the arbitration award had failed to take into account.

A Potentially Broader Reach Beyond the Transportation Sector

Although this decision was rendered in the context of road transportation, the court’s reasoning—that the misconduct lies in the act of consuming alcohol in violation of a clear rule, and not in the employee’s underlying condition—could be transposable to any workplace where safety justifies a zero-tolerance policy.

Notably, the collective agreement at issue provided for immediate dismissal for the consumption of both “alcoholic beverages” and “drugs that may affect [the employee’s] normal behaviour while on duty.” Employers could reasonably anticipate that the court’s reasoning would apply analogously to the consumption of cannabis, opioids, or other intoxicating substances—a particularly timely issue since the legalization of cannabis.

It is worth noting that this decision runs counter to a well-established line of jurisprudence holding that alcoholism and substance dependence constitute a protected disability triggering the duty to accommodate. By prioritizing public safety and the voluntary nature of the consumption, the Superior Court’s opinion provides employers with important support for defending the validity of their zero-tolerance policies.

Next Steps

In light of the 2026 QCCS 289 decision, employers may wish to consider the following steps:

• Reviewing and documenting zero-tolerance policies: Employers may wish to ensure their zero-tolerance policies are clearly drafted, communicated, and uniformly applied. Uniform application is the factor the court relied on to dismiss the allegation of discrimination.
• Anchoring policies in a safety objective: The court emphasized that zero tolerance must constitute a standard that is reasonably necessary to ensure public safety.
• Identifying safety-sensitive positions beyond transportation: Examples include construction, equipment operation, and any sector where substance consumption while on duty poses a danger to the safety of individuals.
• Monitoring developments. The former employee’s union filed a motion for leave to appeal; the state of the case may evolve.

Ogletree Deakins’ Canada offices will continue to monitor developments and provide updates on the Canada, Cross-Border, Drug Testing, Trucking & Logistics, and Workplace Safety and Health blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• Newly proposed AB 2321 would require Cal/OSHA’s Bureau of Investigations to “timely notify” the local district attorney’s office of any case “in which there is a serious injury or death,” unless “the bureau determines there is legally insufficient evidence of a violation of the law.”
• The referral requirement applies to fatalities and cases of permanent total disability.
• The term “permanent total disability”—language borrowed from the state’s workers’ compensation system—is not a term typically utilized in the Cal/OSHA realm, so it is unclear how Cal/OSHA would make the determination for a referral.
• The law would set up a parallel system of investigation wherein the local district attorney would begin investigating accidents at the same time Cal/OSHA inspectors initiate typical workplace investigations.

If enacted as proposed, AB 2321 would adjust processes within the California Division of Occupational Safety and Health’s (Cal/OSHA) Bureau of Investigations and create a new investigatory procedure in California.

The bill would require Cal/OSHA to turn over accident reports and compiled investigation materials to local district attorneys’ offices. Additionally, the Cal/OSHA Bureau of Investigations would be required to establish written procedures for reviewing cases, determining and justifying any decision not to refer a case to a district attorney or not investigate an accident in which there is a serious injury or death, and additional procedures to refer non-fatal cases to the district attorney.

Next Steps

At present, the Assembly has not held a hearing, taken a vote, or conducted legislative analysis of AB 2321. The Committee on Labor and Employment will hold hearings on the bill in the month of April 2026.

Ogletree Deakins’ California offices and the firm’s Workplace Safety and Health Practice Group will closely monitor developments and provide updates on the California and Workplace Safety and Health blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• Even “just for fun” April Fools’ jokes and pranks must not violate the rights of others or disrupt workplace harmony; in cases of serious violations, German labor law sanctions up to and including termination without notice are possible.
• Content that discriminates against or demeans others may constitute harassment—employers have duties to protect and prevent such behavior.

What counts as an April Fools’ prank?

April Fools’ jokes are defined as deliberately misleading or surprising actions and communications “for fun.” Under labor law, the form, content, context, and effects of such pranks are decisive: If the prank causes significant disruptions (e.g., production downtime, safety risks) or unreasonably infringes on the personal rights of third parties, the interest in protecting the company and those affected generally prevails—the general duty of consideration under Section 241 (2) of the German Civil Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB)) sets limits here.

What is still okay—and what is no longer?

Harmless, short-lived pranks that do not relate to discriminatory characteristics, do not expose individual persons, and do not create safety risks generally remain permissible. In any case, the following are prohibited: deceptions related to safety or compliance (e.g., faked emergencies, technical interference with IT systems); content of an offensive, sexist, racist, or inflammatory nature; and “pranks” that ridicule colleagues. The Schleswig-Holstein Regional Labor Court (Landesarbeitsgericht (LAG)) ruled on such statements that even in supposedly “private” chat groups, dismissal may be justified in individual cases involving severely derogatory remarks—the intent to be humorous does not provide protection in such cases (Judgment of August 19, 2025 – 1 Sa 104/25).

When do warnings or termination become a risk?

Employers generally understand jokes. But if a joke or prank crosses the line of good-natured humor, it is usually a short step to a breach of employment contract obligations, which may warrant a warning or a formal reprimand. If there is good cause, extraordinary termination may be considered in extreme cases; these include, for example, gross insults, discriminatory content, or significant operational and safety impairments.

Takeaway

April Fools’ jokes do not take place in a legal vacuum. To ensure that everyone can enjoy them, employers may want to remind employees that crude, discriminatory, and safety-related jokes can lead to serious consequences, up to and including termination of employment.

Andre Appel is a partner in Ogletree Deakins’ Berlin office.

Pauline von Stechow, a law clerk in Ogletree Deakins’ Berlin office, contributed to this article.

Ogletree Deakins’ Berlin and Munich offices will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Cross-Border and Germany blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• USCIS has received enough H-1B registrations for unique beneficiaries to meet the annual cap.
• Petitioners will have ninety days, beginning on April 1, 2026, to file a completed H-1B petition for each selected beneficiary. Employment in H-1B status can begin no earlier than October 1, 2026.
• The FY 2027 lottery is the first to use the new weighted, wage-level-based selection process established under a DHS rule that took effect on February 27, 2026.

USCIS utilized its electronic preregistration system to carry out the newly implemented weighted selection process and confirmed selection notifications were sent to registrant employers and their authorized representatives of the lottery results through their USCIS online accounts.

USCIS announced that it had selected enough registrations projected to meet the congressionally mandated H-1B cap, including the advanced degree exemption (master’s cap) for FY 2027.

New Weighted Selection Process

The FY 2027 H-1B lottery marks the first cycle conducted under DHS’s final rule establishing a weighted, wage-level-based selection process for cap-subject H-1B petitions. Under this system, which replaced the prior random selection lottery that did not include wage information, registrants are assigned one to four entries in the selection pool based on the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics (OEWS) wage level that corresponds to their offered salary.

Each occupational code by OEWS breaks down wage leveling into Levels I, II, III, and IV, and under this new system, beneficiaries are entered into the registration system depending on which wage level their offered salary would meet based on the specific occupational classification. For example, an offered salary that met wage level IV under an OEWS classification would receive four entries. The weighted process prioritizes higher-paid foreign workers by giving them a greater chance of selection while still allowing entry-level workers to participate. The beneficiary-centric selection system adopted in 2024 remained in effect, but this time incorporating the new wage-based number of registration entries. For more details on the new weighted wage-level rule, see our prior article.

Registrants’ online accounts will display a registration status of “Selected,” indicating they are eligible to file an H-1B cap petition for FY 2027. Registrations that were not selected during the initial process (and that have not been denied or invalidated) will continue to show a status of “Submitted.”

USCIS confirmed selected registrants will have ninety days to file complete H-1B petitions, with the filing window opening on April 1, 2026, and ending on June 30, 2026. Each petition must be accompanied by the corresponding selection notice, a copy of the passport used for the beneficiary’s registration, and supporting evidence demonstrating eligibility for H-1B approval. Petitioners must also ensure that their filed petitions include identifying position information consistent with their registration, including the OEWS wage level, Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) code, and area(s) of intended employment.

Employment under an approved FY 2027 H-1B petition can begin no earlier than October 1, 2026.

USCIS may conduct a second lottery if it does not receive enough H-1B petitions during the filing period to meet the annual cap of H-1Bs issued.

Ogletree Deakins’ Immigration Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Immigration blog as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• A Massachusetts federal court provisionally granted intervention in ongoing litigation challenging the U.S. Department of Education’s ACTS survey, for a limited purpose, to two higher-education associations seeking TROs against the survey deadlines.
• The TRO extends the deadline to complete the ACTS survey to April 14, 2026, for the proposed intervenor associations and their constituent institutions and restrains enforcement of the earlier March 18 and March 31 deadlines against them.
• The court emphasized that it has not yet ruled on full intervention or on preliminary injunctive relief and set an expedited briefing schedule and an April 13, 2026, hearing on those issues.

On March 31, 2026, U.S. District Judge F. Dennis Saylor, IV, in Massachusetts v. U.S. Department of Education, issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) extending the deadline for completion of the ACTS survey for proposed intervenors, the Association of American Universities (AAU) and the Association of Independent Colleges and Universities in Massachusetts (AICUM), and their constituent institutions of higher education, to April 14, 2026.

Background

The underlying lawsuit was filed by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and sixteen other states against the U.S. Department of Education, the secretary of education, the Office of Management and Budget, and its director, challenging the approval and implementation of the ACTS survey as unlawful.

The ACTS survey, which institutions of higher education were initially required to complete by March 18, 2026, significantly expands the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System (IPEDS) data collection. The survey requires institutions to report admissions, aid, and outcomes data disaggregated by race, sex, test scores, GPA, income, and other factors for the current academic year, and, for the first time in IPEDS history, six prior years (2019–20 through 2024–25).

On March 13, 2026, the plaintiff states moved for a TRO. Later that day, the court issued an order extending the ACTS survey deadline to March 25, 2026, to allow for orderly briefing and a hearing. Following additional proceedings, including a March 24, 2026, hearing, the court issued another TRO extending the deadline to April 6, 2026, for the seventeen named state plaintiffs and their “constituent institutions.”

Motions by Higher-Education Associations

On March 19, 2025, the AAU and other national higher-education associations sought leave to file an amicus curiae brief, which the court granted. On March 25, the AAU filed a motion to intervene as a plaintiff and a motion for a TRO. The AAU’s TRO motion asserted, among other things, that ED had extended the ACTS survey deadline for all institutions of higher education to March 31, 2026.

The AICUM filed its own motion to intervene and motion for a TRO on March 30, 2026. Both associations challenge the ACTS survey on grounds similar to those advanced by the state plaintiffs and addressed at the March 24 hearing.

March 31, 2026, Order

To allow for orderly consideration of the associations’ requests and to provide the defendants an opportunity to respond, the court “provisionally” granted the motions to intervene filed by AAU and AICUM, but only “for the limited purpose of considering the proposed plaintiff-intervenors’ motions for a temporary restraining order.” The order expressly states that this is not a ruling on intervention “for all purposes.”

The court issued a TRO that:

• extends the deadline to complete the ACTS survey “for proposed plaintiff-intervenors and their constituent institutions of higher education through April 14, 2026”; and
• restrains the defendants from enforcing either the original March 18, 2026, deadline or the March 31, 2026, extended deadline “against those institutions.”

The court made clear that this TRO is not a grant of preliminary injunctive relief and that such relief will be “subject to future briefing and a hearing.”

Next Steps

Defendants were ordered to respond to the motions to intervene and for a TRO by April 9, 2026. Separately, the court scheduled a hearing on the motions for April 13, 2026.

For now, the March 31 order provides additional, temporary deadline relief from the ACTS survey requirements for the two proposed plaintiff-intervenor associations and their constituent higher-education institutions, while the court considers whether to allow full intervention and whether broader or longer-lasting injunctive relief is warranted.

Higher education institutions may want to stay tuned to the litigation and consider necessary steps to comply with the ACTS survey.

Ogletree Deakins’ Higher Education Practice Group and Workforce Analytics and Compliance Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Compliance, Government Contracting and Reporting, Higher Education, State Developments, and Workforce Analytics and Compliance blogs as additional information becomes available.

This article and more information on how the Trump administration’s actions impact employers can be found on Ogletree Deakins’ Administration Resource Hub.

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