Quick Hits

• The Supreme Court recently found that freight brokers can be sued for negligent hiring after accidents involving motor carriers selected for interstate transport of goods.
• The FAAAA does not override state laws concerning negligent hiring of unsafe motor carriers.

The FAAAA preempts state laws related to prices, routes, and services for commercial trucking companies and brokers. However, a safety exception allows states to maintain safety regulatory authority with regard to motor vehicles.

In this case, the plaintiff was severely injured when his tractor-trailer was hit by another tractor-trailer on an Illinois highway. He sued the driver, the trucking company, and the freight broker. He alleged that the freight broker negligently hired the trucking company and the driver.

The Supreme Court weighed whether the safety exception may apply when there is a common-law claim alleging a freight broker was negligent when it selected a motor carrier to transport cargo. If preempted, remedies are significantly limited. Freight brokers are logistics professionals that connect businesses with carriers to transport products.

The Court found that the plaintiff’s negligent-hiring claim fell within the FAAAA’s safety exception and therefore was not preempted. “A claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not preempted by the FAAAA because states retain authority to regulate safety ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ under the Act,” the Court stated.

Ogletree Deakins’ Trucking and Logistics Industry Group and Workplace Safety and Health Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Trucking and Logistics and Workplace Safety and Health blogs as additional information becomes available.

Kevin P. Hishta is a shareholder in Ogletree Deakins’ Atlanta office.

Robert P. Roginson is a shareholder in Ogletree Deakins’ Los Angeles office.

This article was co-authored by Leah J. Shepherd, who is a writer in Ogletree Deakins’ Washington, D.C., office.

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Quick Hits

• In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts that have stayed claims in pending actions under Section 3 of the FAA maintain jurisdiction to confirm or vacate the resulting arbitral awards under sections 9 and 10 of the FAA.
• In this case, the original employment discrimination claims were sufficient to establish the federal district court’s jurisdiction. The Court ruled that the original claims also established that court’s “authority to resolve the motions to confirm or vacate the arbitral award resolving those claims.”
• According to the Court, “nothing in the FAA precludes the normal operation of federal jurisdiction.”

In Jules v. Andre Balazs Properties, No. 25–83, the Court affirmed a Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling that a federal district court did have jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration award (in a case stemming from an employment discrimination dispute). According to Justice Sotomayor, who authored the opinion of the unanimous Court, “[b]ecause a federal court in this scenario has jurisdiction over the original claims and does not lose that jurisdiction while the case is stayed pending arbitration, it retains jurisdiction to determine whether the arbitral award resolving those claims is valid and should be confirmed.”

In the underlying case, Justice Sotomayor noted, the district court had original jurisdiction over the employee’s federal claims. “It was this very jurisdiction that authorized the court to adjudicate the arbitrability of [the employee’s] claims under the parties’ contract to begin with, before staying litigation pending arbitration. Nothing in the FAA eliminated that jurisdiction while the parties arbitrated,” she wrote.

Questions about federal courts’ jurisdiction over motions to compel arbitration and motions to confirm, vacate, or modify arbitration awards under the FAA can become complicated. Such jurisdiction may depend on whether there are federal or state underlying claims at issue. For further analysis of recent Supreme Court decisions in this area, see our prior articles “Supreme Court Rules FAA Requires Courts to Grant Stay Requests After Compelling Arbitration” and “Supreme Court’s New Arbitration Ruling: Limits Federal Jurisdiction For Confirming or Challenging Arbitration Awards Under the FAA.”

Ogletree Deakins’ Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution blog as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• On May 14, 2026, the DOL announced that it is formally rescinding the Biden administration’s 2024 overtime rule, which was set to increase the white-collar exemption salary threshold to $1,128 per week, and the threshold for the highly compensated employee exemption to $151,164 per year, as of January 1, 2025.
• The rescission follows two federal court rulings in Texas that vacated the 2024 rule, with the Fifth Circuit dismissing the final appeal on May 5, 2026.
• For now, the executive, administrative, and professional exemption threshold remains $684 per week, and the highly compensated employee limit remains $107,432 annually, in accordance with the DOL’s 2019 rule.
• The rescission takes effect on May 15, 2026.

The DOL Wage and Hour Division unveiled a final rule to rescind the regulatory effects of the overtime rule, which would have raised the minimum salary for white-collar workers to be exempt from overtime pay, and restores the federal white-collar exemption thresholds established under a 2019 DOL rule.

The final rule, scheduled for publication in the Federal Register on May 15, 2026, essentially reverses the overtime expansion that would have occurred under the 2024 rule issued by the Biden administration.

The rescission follows the 2024 rule’s being vacated by two federal courts in Texas. On May 5, 2026, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed appeals after the Trump administration stopped defending the 2024 rule in court.

New Final Overtime Rule

In practical terms, the new rule restores the salary threshold for the FLSA overtime exemption for executive, administrative, and professional (EAP) employees to $684 per week and restores the “highly compensated employee” (HCE) exemption threshold to $107,432 in total annual compensation, including at least $684 per week paid on a salary or fee basis.

The April 2024 DOL final rule would have raised the minimum salary for EAP employees to $1,128 per week, the equivalent of a $58,656 annual salary, and the minimum salary for the HCE exemption to $151,164 per year, as of January 1, 2025. These increases would have made potentially millions more white-collar workers eligible for overtime. The rule would have further required automatic updates to those thresholds every three years based on up-to-date wage data.

Legal Battles

In November 2024, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, in Texas v. Department of Labor, vacated the DOL’s 2024 rule on a nationwide basis, finding the rule exceeded the agency’s statutory authority. The Biden DOL had appealed that ruling to the Fifth Circuit.

Then, in December 2024, the Eastern District of Texas issued a summary judgment ruling in a separate case, Flint Avenue LLC v. Department of Labor, again invalidating the overtime rule. The Trump DOL appealed that ruling in February 2025, then later moved to withdraw both appeals, citing plans to revisit the rule. The Fifth Circuit then formally dismissed the final appeal on May 5, 2026, without issuing a merits ruling or sustaining or reversing the 2024 rule.

Separately, in September 2024, during the litigation over the 2024 rule, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 2019 rule. The Fifth Circuit ruled in that case that the DOL has the authority to set minimum salary requirements for the EAP exemption as part of its “explicitly delegated authority to define and delimit the terms of the Exemption.”

Next Steps

The rescission of the 2024 overtime rule is unsurprising given that the Trump administration had signaled that it would revisit the rule. However, the administration is foregoing the process, at least for now, for revising exemption thresholds and instead restoring them to the levels in the 2019 rule. Notably, this removes the 2024 rule’s automatic triennial threshold adjustments.

Ogletree Deakins’ Wage and Hour Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Governmental Affairs and Wage and Hour blogs as additional information becomes available.

This article and more information on how the Trump administration’s actions impact employers can be found on Ogletree Deakins’ New Administration Resource Hub.

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Quick Hits

• USCIS will require use of the Final Action Dates chart for employment-based adjustment of status filings in June 2026.
• EB-1 India final action date retrogresses by three and a half months; EB-2 India retrogresses by more than ten months, signaling continued pressure on India-chargeability backlogs.
• EB-3 dates advance slightly, with China moving forward six weeks and India moving forward one month; EB-5 Unreserved remains current for most countries.
• Additional retrogression in EB-1, EB-2 (India and China), EB-3 (Philippines), and EB-5 Unreserved (India) is possible before the end of FY 2026.

Employment-Based Final Action Dates for June 2026

The June 2026 Visa Bulletin Final Action Dates chart reflects the following:

Source: U.S. Department of State, June 2026 Visa Bulletin

Dates for Filing: Not Applicable for June 2026

Because USCIS has designated the Final Action Dates chart as the operative chart for June 2026, the Dates for Filing chart is not available for employment-based adjustment of status applications this month. Applicants who were eligible to file under the Dates for Filing chart but whose priority dates are not yet current under the Final Action Dates chart will be unable to file in June 2026.

Retrogression Warnings

The State Department flagged several categories for potential retrogression or unavailability before the close of fiscal year (FY) 2026 (September 30, 2026):

• EB-1 and EB-2 for India: High demand has already required retrogression of final action dates; further retrogression or an “unavailable” designation may follow if India’s pro-rated annual limits are reached.
• EB-2 for China: Sufficient demand and increased usage may require retrogression of the final action date in upcoming months.
• EB-3 for Philippines: Similar demand pressures could necessitate retrogression.
• EB-5 Unreserved for India: Retrogression or an “unavailable” designation may occur as early as next month.

The State Department also notes that some visa categories may become “unavailable” prior to the end of the fiscal year if annual limits, category limits, or pro-rated per-country limits are reached.

Next Steps

Employers and foreign nationals with pending or anticipated employment-based adjustment of status applications may want to consider the following:

• confirming whether a priority date is current under the Final Action Dates chart—not just the Dates for Filing chart—before submitting or expecting to submit an adjustment of status application in June 2026;
• for India-chargeability applicants in the EB-1 and EB-2 categories,  determining the impact of retrogression on case timelines;
• for employers sponsoring high volumes of India-born employees in the EB-2 pipeline, assessing risk in light of the potential for further retrogression or unavailability before September 30, 2026; and
• monitoring the USCIS website (uscis.gov/visabulletininfo) for any mid-month determinations affecting chart availability.

Ogletree Deakins’ Immigration Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Immigration blog as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• The Tenth Circuit held that a single mandatory racial sensitivity training—and its alleged aftereffects—did not meet the high bar for a hostile work environment claim under Title VII or Section 1981.
• The court found that training materials using terms like “white exceptionalism” and “white fragility” were not enough standing alone, because the plaintiff could not show they actually changed his job duties or advancement opportunities.
• A failure to investigate employee complaints about training content did not independently create a hostile environment, but the court signaled it could strengthen a claim where other allegations are more substantial.

Summary

In Young v. Colorado Department of Corrections, the Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of hostile work environment and constructive discharge claims brought by Joshua Young, a white former employee of the Colorado Department of Corrections. Young alleged that a mandatory racial sensitivity training created a discriminatory workplace for white employees. After a prior appeal found a single training session insufficient, Young amended his complaint to add allegations about the training’s later effects on his work environment.

The court applied the well-established standard that a hostile work environment claim requires discriminatory conduct “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment.” It found Young’s new allegations fell short: (1) his fear of future trainings was speculative; (2) the training did not require him to adopt any particular ideology; (3) a single disciplinary incident involving another officer did not affect Young’s own conditions; (4) his hesitation about using force reflected internal doubt, not actual job changes; and (5) the employer’s failure to investigate his complaints did not independently establish a hostile environment.

Employer Takeaways

The court acknowledged that diversity trainings can cross the line into unlawful discrimination, but this case offers a roadmap for staying on the right side of that line. Employers may want to include clear disclaimers that employees need not change personal values. Framing trainings as educational, not ideological, and documenting content changes over time, can undercut claims of an ongoing discriminatory program. And while a failure to investigate complaints was not dispositive here, such complaints merit serious attention—particularly where other facts might paint a stronger picture.

Ogletree Deakins’ Employment Law Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Employment Law, Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, State Developments, Utah, and Wyoming blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• Effective July 10, 2026, a new USCIS interim final rule gives adjudicators explicit regulatory authority to deny—rather than merely reject—immigration benefit requests with invalid signatures.
• Unlike a rejection, a denial means USCIS retains the filing fee, and the petitioner must file an entirely new petition to try again.
• Employers, HR professionals, and immigration practitioners may want to review signature workflows now, as USCIS will not permit petitioners to correct or cure an invalid signature after filing.

For employers sponsoring foreign national employees, practitioners managing high-volume filing programs, and any petitioner submitting benefit requests to USCIS, this rule has direct operational implications worth understanding now.

Background

Under longstanding USCIS practice, there are two very different outcomes when a filing doesn’t meet submission requirements:

• Rejection means the package is returned to the sender without adjudication. The fee is refunded. The filing date is not preserved. The petitioner can correct the deficiency and refile, but cannot appeal the rejection.
• Denial means the request was fully adjudicated and found to be ineligible. USCIS keeps the fee. The denial is appealable. And for most benefit types, the petitioner must complete an entirely new petition and pay a new filing fee to try again.

The difference between these two outcomes is significant. And until now, the regulations addressed only rejection for invalid signatures, not denial.

New Rule Implications

The IFR makes clear that if USCIS accepts a benefit request and later determines the signature is invalid, USCIS may, in its discretion, either reject or deny the request. USCIS officers now have explicit regulatory authority, not just policy-level guidance, to choose between the two outcomes based on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Key elements of the new rule include the following:

• Denial is now codified. USCIS has operated under a 2018 policy memorandum stating that it would deny requests with deficient signatures discovered post-acceptance, and the IFR codifies this authority in regulation.
• Fee retention on denial means that when USCIS denies on signature grounds, it retains the filing fee as cost recovery for adjudicative resources already expended.
• Discretion determines the outcome, with adjudicating officers deciding whether to reject or deny based on factors such as how much time and effort has been spent on the case, whether the signature defect appears to be an inadvertent error versus a pattern of noncompliance, and the nature of the signature issue itself.

Importantly, no “cure” is permitted—USCIS reaffirms that it will not allow petitioners to correct or cure an invalid signature after filing. An officer may issue a request for evidence (RFE) or notice of intent to deny (NOID) to confirm signatory authority, but not to invite submission of a corrected signature. The Application for Certificate of Citizenship (Form N-600) and Application for Citizenship and Issuance of Certificate Under Section 322 (Form N-600K) are exempt; given the unique procedural consequences of denial for citizenship certificate applications, those forms are carved out, and for those filings, USCIS may only reject, not deny, when the sole deficiency is an invalid signature.

The rule does not change the definition of a valid or invalid signature; those standards remain the same. What USCIS considers invalid includes: copy-pasted or image-affixed signatures, typewritten names used as a substitute for a handwritten mark, stamped signatures (except in specific enumerated circumstances), signatures by an unauthorized person (such as an attorney or preparer signing in place of the petitioner or beneficiary), and signatures created by signature software programs.

An important distinction is that a scanned, faxed, or photocopied version of an originally signed document is acceptable, but the copy must be of a document that was physically signed with a wet-ink signature.

USCIS’s Reasoning

USCIS points to a documented increase in invalid signatures in recent years, particularly signatures copied from other documents. Total denials on signature grounds rose from 300 in fiscal year (FY) 2021 to 2,953 in FY 2025. The Administrative Appeals Office (AAO) has adjudicated 758 appeals of denials related to copied signatures. The agency also notes that because intake procedures cannot catch many of these defects, officers must sometimes reopen and readjudicate cases after significant work has already been performed.

Electronic Filing

For petitions filed by mail or through PDFi (PDF intake), the valid signature is a handwritten one obtained on a printed copy of the form. For benefit requestors filing directly through USCIS’s guided e-filing system on myUSCIS, a secure electronic signature generated during the e-filing process is valid. Both of those pathways are limited to the requestor; they are not available for attorney-filed submissions. Attorneys filing via PDFi must still obtain a handwritten signature on a printed form, scan it, and upload that document.

Signature software programs, typed names, and stamped signatures are not valid under any filing method. As USCIS continues to expand its e-filing portfolio, the accepted signature method for a given form and filing channel should be verified, since requirements are not uniform across all form types.

Key Takeaways

• Reviewing signature workflows. Each petition must contain an original, individually obtained handwritten signature. Signatures replicated across multiple filings are among the defects the IFR specifically addresses.
• Building in verification steps. Where petition assembly involves non-attorney staff or automated workflows, consider making signature verification a defined step before submission.
• Confirming PDFi requirements. For attorney-filed PDFi submissions, electronic signatures are not accepted. Only a handwritten signature submitted via scan of the originally signed document is valid.
• Evaluating appeal rights on denials. Unlike rejections, denials on signature grounds are appealable via Form I-290B ($800 filing fee). Where a priority date or cap slot is at stake, that option may be worth considering.
• Accounting for processing timelines. Signature defects can be identified well into the adjudication process. Denials with fee retention remain possible even after extended wait times.
• This IFR does not introduce a new signature standard. It introduces real regulatory teeth for an existing one. For immigration practitioners, the appropriate response is not alarm but process review. Signature requirements have always been fundamental to proper filing. This rule makes the cost of ignoring them harder to walk back.

This IFR does not introduce a new signature standard. It introduces real regulatory teeth for an existing one. USCIS has operated under a denial-on-deficient-signature policy since 2018, but codifying that authority in the regulation, combined with explicit fee retention on denial, signals that the agency intends to enforce it more consistently and with greater consequences for noncompliance.

By its terms, the rule states that the “amendment applies to requests submitted on or after July 10, 2026.” Signature requirements have always been fundamental to proper filing; this rule raises the stakes for errors and omissions. For employers, HR professionals, and immigration practitioners, the appropriate response is not alarm but process review.

Ogletree Deakins’ Immigration Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Immigration blog as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, affirmed the holding that an employer could not enforce an arbitration agreement since it was neither a signatory to the contract nor an “affiliate” of the staffing agency.
• The court further held that even if the employer was a third-party beneficiary of the arbitration agreement, the agreement did not cover claims arising after the employment with the staffing agency ended.
• The court further held that equitable estoppel did not apply because the claims were not intertwined with the agreement.

In Toothman v. Redwood Toxicology Laboratory, Inc., the First Appellate District held that an employer could not enforce the arbitration agreement because it was not a party to the contract. The court further held that the agreement did not otherwise cover the former employee’s claims based on agency or third-party beneficiary theories.

Employee Signs Arbitration Agreement With Staffing Agency

The former employee, Robert Toothman, signed the arbitration agreement with Apex Life Sciences, LLC, before being placed with the employer in 2018. Months later, his employment with Apex ended, and he was hired directly by the employer. He did not sign another arbitration agreement. In 2022, he filed a putative class action against the employer. The employer sought to enforce the arbitration agreement signed with Apex. The trial court denied the motion.

The arbitration agreement in question defined the contracting “Company” (i.e., Apex) as the staffing agency together with “its affiliates, subsidiaries and parent companies.” It required arbitration of disputes “arising out of or related to [Toothman’s] employment with, or termination of employment from, Company.” Separately, the companion employment agreement defined the third-party businesses where the agency placed temporary workers as “Clients.”

Employer Not a Party to Arbitration Agreement

The First Appellate District held that the client’s employer was not a party to the arbitration agreement. The employer argued that, as a client, it could be covered by the term “affiliates.” But the First Appellate District found that the common thread in definitions of “affiliates” is a relationship of ownership or control. That was not present here. The court noted that the former employer was a client of the staffing agency, “connected” through “arms-length contractual relationships.”

Further, the court pointed to other language in the arbitration agreement and employment contract regarding Toothman’s at-will assignment status as supporting the interpretation that Toothman was an employee of Apex when he signed the agreement.

Agreement Did Not Cover Employee’s Claims

The appellate court held that even if the employer could establish third-party beneficiary status, the arbitration agreement did not cover the former employee’s claims. The agreement covered disputes arising out of or related to the worker’s employment with the staffing agency. The claims in the class action arose after Toothman began working directly for the employer.

Finally, the court rejected the employer’s argument that the former employee be equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate his claims. The court explained that equitable estoppel allows a party that did not sign a contract to enforce an arbitration agreement if the claims are “dependent upon” or “inextricably intertwined with” the contract containing the arbitration agreement. Here, however, the court found that the former employee’s claims rested entirely on his direct employment with the employer, not on the staffing agency’s employment or arbitration agreement. “If the claims depend on any agreement, it is Toothman’s employment agreement with [the employer],” the court stated.

Key Takeaways for Employers

The Toothman decision is a useful reminder that California courts continue to scrutinize arbitration agreements carefully before enforcing them. Specifically, the First Appellate District refused to enforce the arbitration agreement because the employer was not a signatory to the contract and it did not cover claims arising after the former employer’s employment with the temporary staffing agency.

The case thus suggests that it may be more difficult for employers to rely on agency or third-party beneficiary theories to enforce arbitration agreements with a related entity. Employers that wish to handle employment-related claims in arbitration may want to ensure they execute arbitration agreements directly with former staff agency workers who were placed at their worksites by a staffing agency.

Ogletree Deakins’ California offices and California Class Action and PAGA Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Arbitration and Alternative Dispute Resolution, California, and Class Action blogs as additional information becomes available.

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Quick Hits

• On April 23, 2026, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed a bill (SB 1134) that prohibits counties and municipalities from funding or promoting DEI-related programs, training, and offices.
• The law requires recipients of county and municipal contracts and grants to confirm they do not promote DEI.
• The law will take effect on January 1, 2027.

The new law defines DEI as any effort to:

• “[m]anipulate or otherwise influence the composition of employees with reference to race, color, sex, ethnicity, gender identity, or sexual orientation other than to ensure that hiring is conducted in accordance with state and federal antidiscrimination laws”;
• “[p]romote or provide preferential treatment or special benefits to a person or group based on that person’s or group’s race, color, sex, ethnicity, gender identity, or sexual orientation”; or
• “[p]romote or adopt training, programming, or activities designed or implemented with reference to race, color, sex, ethnicity, gender identity, or sexual orientation.”

The law bars local governments from funding DEI offices or employing DEI officers. Counties and municipalities may not provide or authorize “funds to be used by employees, contractors, volunteers, vendors, or agents to promote diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives.” However, the law allows local governments to recognize official state and federal holidays and support nonprofits that provide single-sex programs for homeless individuals, at-risk youth, and victims of domestic violence.

In addition to the provisions affecting public employers, the law has important implications for private employers that do business with municipalities in Florida. Prior to being awarded a municipal contract or grant, the law requires potential recipients to certify that they do not and will not “use county or municipal funds” to require “employees, contractors, volunteers, vendors, or agents to ascribe to, study, or be instructed using materials relating to diversity, equity, and inclusion.”

The law exempts from the definition of DEI “materials designed to inform a person about the prohibition against discrimination based on protected status under state or federal law.” At a minimum, this would include the prohibition against discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, and national origin pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as the prohibition against discrimination based on the additional characteristics under the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992 (FCRA), which also extends to pregnancy, age, disability, and marital status. This exemption could, however, lead to disagreement over whether training merely “informs” employees of the prohibitions against discrimination or impermissibly addresses the topics prohibited by the law, which often intersect with antidiscrimination training.

The law allows residents to sue local governments for violations and indicates that a violation could constitute “misfeasance or malfeasance in office,” which could affect the types of information that local governments seek from prospective contractors and the criteria for awarding contracts and grants, particularly in counties where similarly motivated challenges have been frequent.

The enactment of the bill follows a similar move in January 2026, when Florida Attorney General James Uthmeier released an opinion indicating that affirmative action in state employment, race-based contracting preferences, and minority representation quotas are unconstitutional.

The action in Florida aligns with the Trump administration’s efforts to eliminate what it considers “illegal DEI” among government contractors, higher education institutions, and the private sector.

Next Steps

Public employers and employers that may be awarded contracts or grants may wish to conduct privileged, proactive audits to evaluate their existing training materials and other practices prior to the effective date of the new law in order to be prepared to certify compliance with the new law.

Ogletree Deakins’ Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Compliance Practice Group and  Workforce Analytics and Compliance Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will post updates on the Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Compliance, Florida, State Developments, and Workforce Analytics and Compliance blogs as additional information becomes available.

Simone R.D. Francis is a shareholder in Ogletree Deakins’ New York and St. Thomas offices.

Gretchen M. Lehman is a shareholder in Ogletree Deakins’ Tampa office.

This article was co-authored by Leah J. Shepherd, who is a writer in Ogletree Deakins’ Washington, D.C., office.

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Quick Hits

• The ADA’s broad definition of “disability” expressly encompasses mental health conditions, which may include major depressive disorder, panic disorder, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), attention deficit disorder, and autism spectrum disorder, among others.
• Employers have an obligation to provide reasonable accommodation(s) that enable employees with mental health disabilities to perform their essential job functions or enjoy the equal privileges and benefits of employment.
• Employees are not entitled to dictate a preferred accommodation; employers may explore and choose among effective alternatives.

How Mental Health Conditions Qualify Under the ADA

The ADA protects qualified individuals with a “disability,” defined as a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities,” a “record of such an impairment,” or “being regarded as having such an impairment.” (Emphasis added.) Through the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Congress made it unmistakably clear that this definition must be construed broadly in favor of coverage—a mandate that the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the courts have firmly embraced.

The ADA regulations define “mental impairment” to include “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder such as intellectual disability, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disability.” The regulations expressly exclude “disorders resulting from current illegal use of drugs,” “sexual behavior disorders,” and certain compulsive behaviors.

As noted above, a mental impairment must substantially limit a major life activity to constitute a disability. The regulations provide a non-exhaustive list of such activities, which, as relevant to mental impairments, include “learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, writing, communicating, interacting with others, and working.” The regulations further provide that mental impairments may “substantially limit [the major life activity of] brain function.”

Conditions need not be permanent or severe to qualify as a disability. Moreover, whether a condition constitutes a disability is determined “without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,” such as medication, therapy, or coping strategies. Notably, however, the negative side effects of medication may themselves substantially limit a major life activity and support the finding of a disability. The use or nonuse of mitigating measures may nonetheless be relevant in assessing whether an employee is qualified for a position, poses a direct threat to the safety of himself or herself or others, or requires reasonable accommodation.

The EEOC provided additional guidance on mental disabilities in its 1997 Enforcement Guidance on the ADA and Psychiatric Disabilities. (Although still in effect, the guidance was issued prior to the ADA Amendments Act and contains some information that is no longer applicable; however, other parts continue to offer helpful information.) That guidance offers wide-ranging and non-exhaustive examples of covered conditions such as major depression, bipolar disorder, anxiety disorders (including panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and PTSD), schizophrenia, and personality disorders. The guidance clarifies that mental impairments do not include stress or common personality traits, such as poor judgment or a quick temper, standing alone.

Guidance for Employers

Mental Health Awareness Month offers a timely opportunity to review disability-related policies, procedures, and practices, and to remember that situations potentially involving mental impairments/disabilities often call for careful navigation. Below are areas of focus and consideration for employers addressing mental impairments/disabilities in the workplace:

• Refraining from disability-related inquiries. Employers generally should refrain from inquiring about whether an employee has a mental impairment/disability. Under the ADA, medical questions are permissible only when they are job-related and consistent with business necessity. The better practice is to focus on the employee’s conduct or performance concerns and to allow the employee to raise any mental health issues voluntarily.
• Confirming a request for accommodation. If an employee discloses a mental disability, employers may wish to confirm whether the employee is requesting an accommodation and what that requested accommodation is. Any such exchange should be documented.
• Manager training. Employers may wish to train their managers to recognize when an accommodation request is being made, even informally, and to involve human resources immediately. An employee need not use the words “ADA,” “reasonable accommodation,” or “disability.” Simply stating that he or she is having difficulty with some job requirement because of a mental health condition may be sufficient to trigger the reasonable accommodation obligation.
• Fitness-for-duty examinations. There may be circumstances when an employee is clearly unable to perform his or her essential job functions or poses a direct threat because of a suspected mental health issue. In those situations, it may be appropriate to send an employee for a fitness-for-duty examination.
• The interactive process. When an employee seeks an accommodation for a mental disability, it may be wise for employers to engage in the interactive process. Through this dialogue, the employer may obtain information from the employee’s treating healthcare provider about the employee’s limitations, the impact on any major life activities, whether mitigating measures are available and being used, and the availability and reasonableness of possible accommodations.
• Alternative accommodations. An employee’s requested accommodation may not be the only, or most appropriate, option. There may be alternative accommodations that would enable the employee to perform his or her essential job functions or to enjoy the equal privileges and benefits of employment. While many employees currently request remote work as an accommodation, the EEOC’s 1997 guidance and its more recent Telework Guidance make clear that other potentially effective accommodations could include things such as, but not limited to, assistive technology, written instructions, modified equipment, environmental modifications (addressing sound, smell, light, etc.), job restructuring, or modified schedules. The government website, AskJAN.org, has additional accommodations that employers may wish to consider.
• Checking on the employee and the accommodation. It may be wise to follow up with the employee to see how the accommodation is working. Reasonable accommodations are not set in stone—if they are not working or if circumstances change, the employer may engage in further discussions with the employee to identify other accommodations.
• Considering the “accommodation of last resort.” If no accommodation would enable the employee to perform his or her essential job functions, the employer may wish to determine whether there are any other available positions for which the employee is qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation. The EEOC treats reassignment as part of the reasonable accommodation obligation (though federal courts are divided on the extent of that obligation), to be considered before moving to termination of employment.
• Maintaining confidentiality. All medical information received must be kept confidential and separate from the employee’s personnel file. In addition, an employer should not share details about an employee’s mental disability or the reason for an accommodation with coworkers. If questions arise, one effective response is to state that the matter is a confidential personnel issue and that the company complies with all applicable laws.

Ogletree Deakins’ Leaves of Absence/Reasonable Accommodation Practice Group will continue to monitor developments and will provide updates on the Employment Law and Leaves of Absence blogs as additional information becomes available.

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DHS ‘Duration of Status’ Proposal Nears Finalization. A proposed U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) / U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) rulemaking, “Establishing a Fixed Time Period of Admission and an Extension of Stay Procedure for Nonimmigrant Academic Students, Exchange Visitors, and Representatives of Foreign Information Media,” took a significant step toward finalization this week. After reviewing the public comments on the proposal for approximately seven months, on May 5, 2026, ICE transmitted a draft final rule to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for review. The OIRA review process can take days or even weeks and is the last step in the regulatory process before a rule is finalized.

The proposal would set a four-year maximum period of stay for students on F-1 and J-1 nonimmigrant visas. In 2020, the first Trump administration proposed a similar rule, but it was later withdrawn by the Biden administration. Larkin Dykstra has additional details.

NLRB GC Reassigns Cases to Address Backlog. According to media reports, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) has approximately 17,000 open unfair labor practice cases. To help alleviate this backlog, this week the Board’s general counsel (GC), Crystal Carey, transferred 3,500 unfair labor practice cases from overloaded regional offices to locations with greater capacity to process them in a timely manner. In addition to this week’s action, earlier this year, Carey took steps to streamline case processing by ensuring that pertinent information is collected when an initial charge is filed.

‘Faster Labor Contracts Act’ Update. With the U.S. House of Representatives in recess, progress on the Democrats’ efforts to force a vote on the Faster Labor Contracts Act—a bill that would impose an artificial collective bargaining timeline on employers and labor unions—has understandably stalled. Additionally, the bill would empower government bureaucrats to set the contractual terms if the parties cannot reach an agreement in a prescribed time period. Republican leaders in the House aren’t interested in advancing the bill, so Democrats are hoping to get at least 218 House members to sign a petition that, pursuant to House rules, would trigger a floor vote. So far, 199 members of the House—all Democrats—have signed the petition. Proponents of the discharge petition will need the 13 remaining Democrats to sign, in addition to 6 Republicans, though House membership numbers are often in flux. A companion bill in the U.S. Senate has sixteen cosponsors, including three Republican senators: Josh Hawley (Missouri), Bernie Moreno (Ohio), and Roger Marshall (Kansas).

DOL Drops Defense of Biden-Era Overtime Regulation. This week, the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) dropped its defense of the Biden-era overtime rule. The rule, which would have increased the Fair Labor Standards Act’s (FLSA) minimum salary threshold overtime exemption to $58,656 per year beginning on January 1, 2025, was vacated by two different federal district courts in Texas in late 2024. In early 2025, the Trump administration actually filed an appeal of one of these decisions, presumably as a placeholder to buy time to figure out how it would eventually address the regulation. Now, with the DOL dropping the appeal and no longer defending the rule, the 2019 regulation remains in place, which sets the salary basis threshold for the overtime exemption at $35,568 per year. Looking ahead, the most recent regulatory agenda (released in September 2025) lists potential changes to the FLSA overtime regulations as a “long-term action.”

USCIS to Resume Benefit Requests for Certain Physicians. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has quietly lifted a hold on the processing of benefit requests—such as visa and work authorization renewals—filed by physicians from certain countries. These holds were the result of USCIS policy memoranda issued in late 2025 and early 2026 that ordered “a comprehensive review of all policies, procedures, and screening and vetting processes for benefit requests for aliens from countries listed” in President Donald Trump’s expanded travel ban of December 2025. Amidst an ongoing physician shortage in the United States, USCIS has now updated its website to state, “Holds have been lifted for … applications associated with medical physicians.”

An Ap-peel-ing Bill. This week, the House passed legislation that would make it legal to peel bananas. Well, that is at least how the bill’s champion, Democratic Representative Marie Gluesenkamp Perez of Washington State, describes her bill that was included as an amendment to the Farm, Food and National Security Act of 2026 (H.R. 7567) (colloquially referred to as the “Farm Bill”), which passed the House this week.

The “Cutting Red Tape on Child Care Providers Act of 2025” (H.R. 1889) responds to state regulations that supposedly prevent child care providers from peeling bananas or cutting raw vegetables to serve to children. These regulations classify such actions as “food preparation,” which requires multiple sinks and other public health-related capital investments. According to Representative Gluesenkamp Perez, daycare providers are, therefore, incentivized to provide children with packaged foods rather than fresh fruits and vegetables. The “Cutting Red Tape on Child Care Providers” bill would address this situation by prohibiting states that receive federal childcare grants from enacting “any barriers on the simple preparation of fresh fruits and vegetables for facilities, licensed or licensed exempt.”